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I. INTRODUCTION
Though Congress often delegates many tasks to public agencies, each agency can usually 
claim to have a primary mandate, which is reflected in its organic or enabling legislation. So, for 
example, one could fairly say that the National Highway Transportation and Safety 
Administration’s primary mandate is “highway safety,” the Department of Transportation’s is 
“infrastructure development,” and the Food and Drug Administration’s is “public health 
protection.”  Frequently, however, Congress imposes additional or secondary mandates on an 
implementing agency. Secondary mandates can be substantive or procedural: they may limit the 
discretion of the lead agency, or impose obligations to consider additional factors, perform a 
particular analysis, or consult with specific players. Frequently, Congress imposes these 
mandates indirectly, by passing entirely separate statutes unrelated to the agency’s original 
enabling act.1 Thus, for example, Congress might create the Federal Power Commission (FPC) in 
1920 and charge it with the authority to license hydropower production,2 and at a later time pass 
a series of environmental statutes with which the agency (now the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission),3 in theory, must also comply. In this sense, Congress can create the potential for 
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1
 Many statutes do not impose a mandate on a particular agency, but rather impose burdens on all agencies equally, 
providing they engage in a “triggering” activity. See e.g., the National Environmental Policy Act, 1969 which, per § 
102(2)(C), requires all federal agencies to produce environmental impact statements for major federal projects with 
a significant impact on the environment and the Endangered Species Act, 1973, which, per §7, requires all federal 
agencies to “consult” with the Department of Interior (or for marine species the Department of Commerce) to ensure 
that federal agency action is not likely to jeopardize the survival of a listed species.  
2
 Prior to the passage of the FPA, the Secretaries of War, Agriculture and Interior each had authority to issue 
licenses for hydroelectric projects on lands under their respective jurisdiction, an approach that led to confusion and 
inefficiency. The Act centralized authority in a single agency by creating a commission consisting of the three 
Secretaries. The Commission was reorganized in 1930 to consist of five persons independent of the three 
Secretaries. See Act of June 23, 1930 ch. 572, 46 Stat. 797.
3 The FPC was reorganized by Congress into the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in 1977. See 42 
U.S.C. §7171 (1977).
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inter-statutory conflicts, meaning that Congress creates a situation in which the agency must 
balance multiple and potentially competing obligations arising from different statutes usually 
passed at different times by different enacting majorities. 
Agencies frequently resolve such inter-statutory conflicts by prioritizing their primary 
mission and letting their secondary obligations fall by the wayside. Consider the historical 
reluctance of licensing and development agencies to comply with environmental mandates in the 
early years of environmental legislation. Federal agencies such as the Atomic Energy 
Commission, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of Transportation and the FERC 
famously resisted complying with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),4 the Clean 
Water Act (CWA),5 the Endangered Species Act,6 and a host of other environmental laws when 
they were first passed in the late sixties and seventies.7 This resistance is problematic, of course: 
it results in under-implementation of some congressional goals in favor of others. And while it 
arises frequently in the environmental context, we imagine that it occurs in other settings as well.
In this article, we explore this problem of agency reluctance in the face of multiple 
mandates. Specifically, we explain how and why agencies might resist secondary mandates, 
which typically—though not always—come in the form of obligations imposed in separate 
statutes passed after Congress delegates the agency’s primary mission in its enabling law.8
Relying on an illustrative study of FERC’s resistance to environmental legislation, we explain 
the political and economic forces that operate to encourage agency reluctance: congressional 
committees that reward an agency’s pursuit of its primary mission to the exclusion of its 
obligations under other statutes; executive oversight that fails to force agency compliance with 
multiple and potentially conflicting obligations arising in different statutes; interest group 
pressure that supports the agency’s primary mission but not its secondary ones; and aspects of 
agency culture and organization that create obstacles to full compliance with all mandates.  
But our story, at bottom, is one of agency reluctance overcome. We argue that agencies 
can be prompted to take their secondary missions more seriously when Congress enhances the 
power of other agencies, with relevant expertise and interests derived from their own statutory
mandates, to lobby them.9 In our example, Congress does this in a particular way, namely by 
4 Cite
5 Cite
6 Cite
7 See DANIEL A. MAZMANIAN & JEANNE NIENABER, CAN ORGANIZATIONS CHANGE? (1979) (documenting the 
Army Corps of Eingineers’ resistance to modifying its historical mission of building large water-resource 
development projects in light of the environmental imperatives of NEPA); SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING 
BEAURACRACIES THINK (1984) (providing a case study of how NEPA was implemented and resisted in the Forest 
Service and Army Corps of Engineers); JEANNE NIENABER CLARKE & DANIEL C. MCCOOL, STAKING OUT THE 
TERRAIN, (2D ED. 1996) (explaining that agency’s may not easily integrate the functions and purposes of new 
legislation even when it accords with their own original mission).
8
 Congress can create intra-statutory conflicts by giving an agency conflicting duties at the outset, and then 
expecting the agency to make difficult trade-offs. Indeed, one can argue that the Federal Power Act of 1920 
originally charged FERC with responsibility to license hydropower and to protect non-power values. Still, our study 
emphasizes the secondary mandates that came later in the form of environmental laws.
9
 We use this term purposely, to convey the idea that agencies might seek to influence each other in order to achieve 
a desired outcome, much the same as private lobbyists might try to pressure legislators and bureaucrats to achieve 
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amending the agency’s enabling law. In so doing, Congress transforms an inter-statute conflict 
that the agency can ignore, into an intra-statute one that it cannot.10
We base our argument on an empirical study of FERC’s licensing decisions from 1983-
1998. The period covers the years immediately prior to, and following, the passage in 1986 of 
the Electrical Consumer’s Protection Act (ECPA). What difference did this legislation make? It 
specifically strengthened the ability of resource management agencies to influence FERC in the 
hydropower licensing process. ECPA solidified and enhanced the leverage of these agencies, 
which served as a mechanism for forcing FERC to pay attention to the environmental concerns it 
had long ignored. 
Indeed, ECPA requires FERC to do many of the things that it was in theory already 
obligated to do under both the Federal Power Act (FPA) and existing environmental laws, but 
didn’t. For example, ECPA explicitly requires that FERC consult federal and state fish and 
wildlife agencies in order to assess, and then mitigate, the adverse environmental impact of 
proposed dams. 11 FERC was already obligated to do this pursuant to the Fish and Wildlife 
Coordination Act (FWCA), yet did so rather half-heartedly at best.12 To take another example, 
ECPA explicitly requires FERC to give “equal consideration” in its licensing decisions to non-
power values, such as the protection of fish and wildlife resources. Though ECPA made this 
requirement explicit, FERC was at least arguably bound to do this already, under the FPA as it 
their desired legislative or administrative ends. Of course the two are different. Yet, while sister agencies may not 
use all of the same means of exerting influence as private lobbyists (e.g., campaign contributions), they certainly use 
some of the same means (e.g., providing useful information; threatening litigation; threatening to go over the head of 
the agency to members of Congress or higher ups in the White House). In response to some readers who have 
flinched at our use of the term to describe government activity, we should clarify that we do not mean to suggest that 
the activity is somehow perjorative. Nor do we mean to describe agencies as lobbyists before Congress. Rather, we 
focus on the role that agencies play in lobbying their sister agencies for particular outcomes. 
10 We are quick to note that the form Congress uses to enhance inter-agency lobbying need not be the one we 
observe—that is, Congress could accomplish the same thing without amending the enabling law itself—yet, 
amending the agency’s enabling statute may prove optimal for a variety of reasons. See infra note and 
accompanying text.
11
 All dams have a significant impact on the environment, by altering flow rates and water quality. Inadequate 
stream flow due to impounded water can destroy fish habitat and spawning areas, and can adversely affect upstream 
and downstream passage. For example, dams in the Pacific Northwest have had a devastating impact on anadromous 
fish runs (e.g., Chinook, coho and sockeye salmon) because these fish use the Columbia River and its tributaries to 
migrate to the Pacific Ocean, where they mature and then return upstream to spawn. Dams interfere with fish 
migration in both directions. Without fish ladders and other forms of assistance, adult fish may not survive the 
upstream migration. Similarly, juvenile fish migrating downstream may be killed when passing through turbines, or 
may abandon migration prematurely due to the challenges of passing around the dam or because of insufficient 
stream flow (due to impounded water). Dams also adversely affect habitat by increasing water temperatures, 
reducing oxygen levels, contributing to erosion and degrading water quality. See Sarah C. Richardson, Note, The 
Changing Political Landscape of Hydropower Project Relicensing 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 499, 
508 (2000); Melissa Powell, Note, A Case Study for Stakeholders: An Alternative to Traditional Hydrolectric 
Relicensing 18 ENERGY L. J. 405, 406 (1997). The environmental conditions imposed on dam licensees can help to 
ameliorate these effects. Conditions can include requirements for minimum stream flows, bank enhancements to 
control erosion, and limitations on effluent to maintain water quality.
12 See 16 U.S.C. 661 et seq.
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had been construed by courts13 and pursuant to the FWCA as it had been amended by Congress. 
Yet FERC had, for a variety of reasons, long resisted doing so.14
ECPA also reinforced the need for FERC to comply with a suite of environmental 
statutes passed half a century after the FPA, which FERC had either ignored or adhered to only 
minimally. These include the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which requires 
federal agencies to produce environmental impact statements for proposed major actions that 
would significantly affect the environment, and the Endangered Species Act (ESA), which 
requires federal agencies to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine 
Fisheries Service to ensure dams will not jeopardize endangered species.15 At least until the mid-
13
 Section 10(a) of the FPA of 1920 requires FERC to grant licenses on the determination that the project will be 
“best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit 
of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization of water-power development, and for other 
beneficial public uses including recreational purposes….” It seems unlikely, given the political context of the time 
that Congress intended, even with this broad “public interest” standard, that nonpower values would receive equal 
consideration along with development values.  
14In 1934, Congress passed the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act requiring in § 3(b) that the federal government 
consult the Bureau of Fisheries prior to the construction of any public or private dam, and to make “due and 
adequate provision, if economically practicable” for the mitigation of fish life to the upper waters of the dam via fish 
passage facilities such as fish ladders. See Fish and Wildlife coordination Act, March 10, 1934, Ch. 55, 48 Stat. 401, 
16 U.S.C.§§661 to 666c (S.2529; P.L. 73-121). The Act was amended four times between 1934 and 1965. Each time 
Congress required the government to do more to consider the impact of hydropower on fish and wildlife, and each 
time Congress strengthened the hand of other agencies in the dam licensing process. In 1948, Congress specifically 
required in §5(a) that in managing facilities on a particular stretch of the Mississippi River, federal government 
agencies are “hereby directed to give full consideration and recognition to the needs of fish and other wildlife 
resources.” See June 19, 1948, Ch. 528, 62 Stat. 497, 16 U.S.C. §665a (H.R. 2721; P.L. 80-697). And in 1958 
Congress explicitly amended the Act for the purpose of ensuring that, “wildlife conservation shall receive equal 
consideration and be coordinated with other features of water-resource development.” See § 2. Congress required 
that permitting agencies consult with state and federal wildlife agencies “with a view to the conservation of wildlife 
resources by preventing loss of and damages to them” in connection with water development. See §2a, August 12, 
1958, P.L. 85-624, 72 Stat.563, 16 U.S.C. §661 to 664 (H.R.13138). In addition, the Pacific Northwest Power 
Planning and Conservation Act applies specifically to the Columbia River system and imposes substantive rather 
than procedural obligations. It requires federal agencies responsible for managing hydropower projects on the 
Columbia system to, among other things, “adequately protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife…in a manner 
that provides equitable treatment for such fish and wildlife with the other purposes for which such system and 
facilities are managed…” 16 U.S.C.§839b(h)(11)(A)(i).
15 See e.g., The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 1968,  § 7(a) which applies specifically to FERC, limiting the agency’s  
authority to license or grant an exemption to any project that is on or directly affects a river designated or proposed 
as part of the national system, as determined the Secretaries of Interior or Agriculture. WSRA currently protects 
over 11,000 miles of 158 rivers. WSRA "study rivers" are designated by  the Secretary of Interior or Agriculture as 
under consideration for inclusion in the national system. FERC is barred from issuing hydropower licenses for 3-
years after a river is designated "study river," and for additional 3-years after completion of Presidential reports 
required by study program. Rivers may ultimately become part of the national system by one of two routes: through 
an act of Congress (federally funded), or by State designation (State funded). A proposed project need not adversely 
affect a designated river or study river to fall under the WSRA § 7(a) license prohibition; it need only be found to 
"directly affect" a designated or proposed river within the national system. WSRA § 7(a) does not, however, 
"preclude licensing of, or assistance to, developments below or above a wild, scenic or recreational river area or on 
any stream tributary thereto which will not invade the area or unreasonably diminish [its] scenic, recreational, and 
fish and wildlife values." See also, the Clean Water Act (1972) § 401, which, unlike WSRA generally applies to all 
federal agencies. Under §401, projects that  require a federal permit or license must first receive state certification 
See also, The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, § 106 also generally applies to all federal agencies, 
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1980s, FERC largely disregarded these laws, along with the FWCA, the CWA, the Wild and 
Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA), and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA),  prioritizing 
instead its original pro-power and, therefore, pro-licensing mission.16 By reinforcing these 
mandates, ECPA sought to halt FERC’s systematic bias against environmental values.
ECPA not only reiterated FERC’s obligations, however, it added to them.17 For example, 
to the extent that FERC did consider non-power values in licensing decisions, it had always 
required license applicants themselves to consult with state and federal resource agencies before
submitting their applications to FERC. ECPA altered this, subtly but importantly, by placing the 
burden of such consultation directly on the FERC.18 Second, ECPA required, for the first time, 
that FERC establish a dispute resolution process to mediate its disagreements with other 
agencies.19 Third, the statute demanded that FERC provide an explanation whenever it chose not 
implement the recommendations of other agencies, something it had not been directly obligated 
to do before.20 And finally, ECPA forced FERC to engage in monitoring to ensure that dam 
operators complied with any environmental conditions, something that had been done only rather 
ineffectively in the past.21 While all of these impositions might be viewed as procedural, they 
were clearly intended to have a substantive effect.22
including FERC. Prior to licensing any project, the federal agency must assess the effects of its licensing on historic 
properties and provide the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation with a reasonable opportunity to comment. 
The Advisory Council's regulations implementing § 106 provide for agreements among federal agencies, State 
Historic Preservation Officers, and the Advisory Council as a means of assessing effects on historic properties and 
affording the Advisory Council its opportunity to comment. If the proposed action involves a large or complex 
project, or includes a class of undertakings that would otherwise require numerous individual requests for 
comments, a Programmatic Agreement (PA) may be used. A PA that addresses the effects of a hydroelectric project 
on historic properties (sometimes also referred to as "cultural resources") is one means of providing that comment 
opportunity to the Advisory Council. Properties of traditional religious and cultural importance to an Indian tribe 
(traditional cultural properties) are considered historic properties if they meet the eligibility criteria for inclusion on 
the National Register of Historic Places, and agencies must consult with Indian tribes attaching religious or cultural 
significance to those properties when carrying out their § 106 responsibilities. There is scant mention of the NHPA 
in federal circuit court decisions addressing a party's appeal of a FERC licensing decision. There appears to be a 
very low threshold for satisfying NHPA requirements, and there is no mandate for FERC to ameliorate all 
potentially adverse effects that a proposed hydropower project may have on identified cultural resources. FERC has 
historically treated these provisions as having a limited reach and sees them as aimed solely at discouraging federal 
agencies from ignoring preservation values in projects they initiate, approve funds for, or otherwise control.
16
 On FERC’s record regarding fish and wildlife, see Bodi & Erdheim, Swimming Upstream: FERC’s Failure to 
Protect Anadromous Fish, 13 ECOLOGY L. Q. 7 (1986). See also, Blumm, A Trilogy of Tribes v. FERC: Reforming 
the Federal Role in Hydropower Licensing, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1986).
17
 Among other things, ECPA did the following: 1) established new procedures for processing relicense applications 
to increase opportunities for agencies, interested organizations, and the public to participate in the process; 2) 
required FERC to base its recommendations for mitigating adverse effects of a licensing/relicensing proposal on the 
recommendations of federal and state resource managing agencies and to negotiate with the agencies if 
disagreements occur; and 3) required FERC to give the same level of consideration to the environment, recreation, 
fish and wildlife, and other non-power values that are given to power and development objectives in making a 
licensing/relicensing decision.
18 Prior to ECPA’s passage, FERC regulations required that license applicants consult with resource agencies prior 
to submitting their final application to FERC. For more on the process, see infra, note and accompanying text.
19
 Section 10 (j).
20 Id.
21
 Section 12 of ECPA requires the agency to monitor and investigate compliance with each license and permit, and 
provides the Commission with the authority to revoke licenses and issue penalties for non-compliance. For a critique 
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We argue that these changes made a significant difference because, collectively, they 
facilitated and intensified inter-agency lobbying.23 Taken together, the data tell us that agencies 
do lobby one another; that Congress can make a difference by intensifying that lobbying; and 
that additional lobbying alters agency outcomes.
We base this conclusion on six key findings. First, our data show that, on average, FERC 
imposed more that twice the environmental conditions in dam re-licensing proceedings after 
1990, a date by which we can be certain that ECPA had been fully implemented.24 Second, our 
data show that public resource agencies representing environmental concerns intervened in 
FERC re-licensing decisions more frequently than any other groups during the period we studied 
(both before and after ECPA was passed).25 This tells us nothing in particular about the effect of 
ECPA, but it does tell us that agencies are active players in the decision making processes of 
sister agencies. 
Third, by comparing public agency participation before and after ECPA, we show that 
public agency participation increased after the statute was passed, climbing steadily over time. 
of FERC’s monitoring and compliance investigations prior to ECPA, see John D. Echeverria, “The Electric 
Consumer’s Protection Act of 1986” 8 Energy L. J. 61, 81-2(1987). 
22
 The difference between a substantive mandate and a procedural one can be less than clear. By substantive, 
commentators usually mean requirements that more directly affect agency outcomes, either by dictating them or 
constraining discretion to a greater extent. By procedural, they typically mean requirements that agencies must 
follow, but which, once followed, do not necessarily affect the outcome—like a box the agency has to check before 
doing what it wants to do anyway. For example, if a statute requires an agency to set safety standards within a given 
range, or without regard to cost, such burdens might fairly be considered substantive. In these two examples, 
respectively, if an agency sets a standard outside the specified range, or sets a lower standard because of cost 
considerations, the agency risks being overturned. The statute in these two cases seems to constrain the agency’s 
actual choice. However, if a statute requires an agency merely to consult another agency before rendering a decision, 
commentators often consider this to be a procedural requirement. Now, if the agency skips the consultation it might 
still be overturned, but as long as it does take that step, the agency’s ultimate decision remains in its discretion. 
Ultimately, the agency will prevail if it dots its procedural “i”s and crosses it’s procedural “t”s. However, procedural 
impositions of this kind can in practice affect substantive outcomes (e.g., a consultation could affect the agency’s 
ultimate decision by providing it with new information, or the consultation might reveal information that gives a 
reviewing court reason to doubt the rationality of the agency’s ultimate decision). And judges can make procedural 
obligations seems more substantive, just as they can neutralize seemingly substantive impositions by making them 
seem merely procedural (see e.g., Vermont Yankee v. NRDC holding that NEPA is a procedural statute despite 
cases suggesting otherwise). So while we invoke the two categories of procedural and substantive as if they are 
conceptually meaningful, in practice they can often amount to the same thing. 
23 We chose the 1990 date for purposes of comparing public agency intervention rates, and numbers of 
environmental conditions imposed, before and after ECPA because we believe that after 1990 we can be certain that 
ECPA was fully implemented. To some extent, ECPA must have influenced FERC even sooner. Indeed, some of our 
interviews suggest that the agency shifted course internally very quickly because it was already modifying its 
approach to licensing. And we are aware that regulations often lag behind internal change. Still, the regulations 
formally implementing ECPA took several years to produce, with the most important of them promulgated in 1988 
and 1999. To be safe then, we assumed that ECPA was fully implemented only once those key rules were 
promulgated. Even if we had chosen an earlier date, however, our conclusion would be the same. The time trend 
shows a gradual increase in the effect of ECPA from 1986 on. 
24
 The number of conditions jumped from an average of about five to an average of twelve conditions.
25
 Indeed, our data show that public agencies comprised 60% of all intervenors in FERC proceedings over this time.
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After 1990, by which the statute can be assumed to be fully operational, the rates of participation 
jumped even more: the average participation of public intervenors in FERC licensing 
proceedings increased 300 per cent after this date, from an average of 3.2 public intervenors to 
an average of 10.5.26 While participation rates for all intervenors increased post-ECPA, none 
spiked as much as the public agencies.27
Fourth, when more agencies intervene, outcomes change. Over the period we studied, 
public intervenors had a significant impact on the number of environmental conditions imposed 
by FERC: for every additional federal agency that attended a relicensing hearing, FERC imposed 
an average of three-quarters of an additional environmental condition on the license; for every 
additional state agency, FERC imposed an average of approximately one third of an additional 
environmental condition. The average cumulative effect of federal and state agency participation 
in FERC licensing proceedings is approximately four extra environmental conditions.
Fifth, the data show that the magnitude of the influence each of these public agencies 
exerted on environmental conditions increased, almost doubling on average after ECPA was 
fully implemented. Finally, when the increase in agency intervention is considered together 
with the increase in the magnitude of their influence, we find that public agencies were 
associated with 60 percent of all environmental conditions following the full implementation 
ECPA, which is up from about 20 percent in the period prior to ECPA’s full implementation. 
In short, on the basis of these findings, we hypothesize that inter-agency lobbying occurs, 
that it affects outcomes, and that Congress can intervene to intensify it.
Our example illustrates how Congress can encourage an agency to internalize the 
secondary mandates it has long ignored by augmenting the influence of other agencies on 
decision making. In doing so, Congress can reinforce authority that the outside agencies may 
already, to some extent, possess, but which for a variety of reasons have failed to use effectively. 
Now one might ask: why should the result we observe be surprising? After all, as an 
independent agency, FERC is a creature of Congress. By passing ECPA, Congress finally 
ordered FERC to care about the environment, effectively saying, “we really mean it this time.” 
Surely it makes sense for the agency to change its ways. But what interests us is that Congress 
does this in a particular way—by reinforcing and invigorating outside agencies as lobbyists. And 
this succeeds where other attempts to influence the agency— via the imposition of separate 
environmental mandates in statutes like NEPA—have failed. Thus, inter-agency lobbying may 
be part of the solution to the problem of the reluctant agency. 
To be clear, we do not claim that ECPA was solely responsible for overcoming FERC’s 
reluctance to comply with its secondary environmental mandates. Indeed, the agency was 
already, in the early eighties, taking these obligations more seriously because of a combination of 
events, including significant losses in the courts. As one FERC insider put it, “we were getting 
26
 This represents the biggest absolute increase of any types  of intervenors in FERC’s licensing decisions.  
27
 The participation by all intervenors rose from an average of about five to an average of almost sixteen--a tripling 
in participation.
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whacked, repeatedly.” Indeed, the number of environmental conditions per license had already 
begun to rise when ECPA was passed.28 Still, we argue, passing ECPA made a difference. The 
statute clearly intensified the underlying inter-agency dynamic, encouraging agencies to be even 
more aggressive than they might otherwise have been, and locking in their influence in 
perpetuity. Our data show that the boost ECPA gave to fish and wildlife agencies had a 
meaningful effect, independent of the other influences that also encouraged FERC to change. 
With our argument, we hope to enrich a number of debates. First, we contribute to the 
literature on political control of delegated discretion. We see inter-agency lobbying as a form of 
indirect or “lateral” legislative control over agencies, which supplements other forms of 
legislative control.29 Our argument, therefore, builds on and extends the literature in political 
science regarding congressional control of delegated authority. 30 While scholars have studied 
both ex ante statutory constraints and ex post oversight as potential instruments of control, they 
have paid little attention to the prospect of relying on agencies. Scholars have argued that 
Congress uses a variety of tools to control agency policymaking: by limiting agency discretion 
through specific language; by structuring agencies in ways that favor particular outcomes; by 
adding administrative procedures that are meant to “stack the deck”31 in favor of certain interest 
groups; by structuring the agency in such a way that it automatically favors particular interests; 
by engaging in direct oversight by congressional committees; and by enabling interest groups to 
alert Congress to agency misbehavior by pulling “fire alarms.”32 Given this expansive literature, 
28 See Cornelius M. Kerwin, Transforming Regulation: A Case Study of Hydropower Licensing, Pub. Admin. Rev. 
91, 95 (1990) (showing recommendations per license climbing from 4.5 in 1980 to a high of 9.4 in 1984 and back to 
6.7 in 1986 for an average of 6.2 per license over a six year period). As Kerwin points out, this was likely a response 
to a number of influences, including successful litigation that limited the agency’s capacious reach and unmitigated 
focus on power benefits; successful lobbying by environmental interests; and, to some extent, anticipation of ECPA 
itself. See discussion at infra note, and accompanying text.
29
 For a study of congressional efforts at imposing “structure” and “process” controls on FERC ex ante, which 
similarly focuses on FERC licensing decisions see, David B. Spence, Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to 
Steer Administrative Agencies 28 J. L. STUD. 413 (1999).  Spence concludes that the effectiveness of such controls, 
including ECPA, varies: certain kinds of changes appear to influence agency decisions while others do not. See also, 
Jeffrey S. Hill and James Brazier, Constraining Administrative Decisions: A Critical Examination of the Structure 
and Process Hypothesis, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 373 (1991)  (concluding that the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies 
Act did not on balance make FERC more responsive to environmental concerns).
30 See, e.g., Matthew McCubbins & Talbot Page, “A Theory of Congressional Delegation,” in CONGRESS: 
STRUCTURE AND POLICY (McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds. 1987).
31 See generally,  McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization (1987); Pablo T. Spiller & John Ferejohn, The Economics and Politics of 
Administrative Law and Procedures: An Introduction, JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATION (1992); 
Barry Weingast & Mark Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Policy-Making by the FTC, 
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 91(1983); Joel D. Aberbach, Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of 
Congressional Oversight. Brookings Institution, 1990.
32See Matthew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus 
Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI 165 (1984) (herinafter McCubbins and Schwartz, Police Patrols). It should be 
noted that claims about the extent to which such attempts are successful are hotly debated. Legal scholars in 
particular have resisted claims by political scientists that Congress can effectively manipulate structures and 
procedures in such ways. See e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Procss: Normative, Positive, and 
Critical Stories of Legal Development, 6 J. L. Econ. & Org. 267 (1990) (arguing that procedures enable not only the 
“winning coalition” of interest groups to influence agencies but also open the agency to the influence of the losers); 
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the notion that Congress might seek to alter an agency’s behavior by imposing an additional 
mandate is not new. What is new is the finding that effective legislative control can take the form 
of inter-agency lobbying.33
We contribute, as well, to the literature on interest group theory, by drawing on the 
literature about political control described above. In forcing a reluctant agency to internalize 
secondary mandates by strengthening the hand of other agencies, Congress re-structures the 
interest group market. We show that public agencies are the most frequent participant in FERC 
proceedings, that their presence increased following ECPA, and that this caused a jump in 
environmental conditions. Our result about the impact of inter-agency lobbying is surprising 
given traditional interest group theory, which suggests that private interest groups, such as 
license applicants, are best situated to dominate agency outcomes.  We show, by contrast, that 
public agencies not only participate in this market, but can effectively dominate it.
Political science already tells us that Congress can intervene to adjust the existing interest 
group market in which participants compete to influence agencies. Yet the focus of most of this 
work is private actors and non-profits; much of interest group theory seeks to explain why some 
of these groups have more influence than others. We add a missing ingredient to the mix by 
suggesting that public agencies may be effective participants in this market, and that Congress 
can intervene to embolden them, just as Congress might intervene to empower private 
organizations.34
In addition, our argument builds a bridge between the two literatures just described—
theories of legislative control and theories of interest group influence—by positing inter-agency 
lobbying as a potential mechanism for counter-balancing private influence over agencies, a 
phenomenon we call “unstacking the deck.” If public agencies are effective at influencing sister 
agencies, and if Congress can intervene to make them more so, perhaps these agencies will give 
voice to a set of interests that might balance or neutralize the influence of private (usually well-
financed and industry dominated), groups. Traditional public choice theory would predict that 
private groups representing concentrated costs and benefits would prevail in this setting. Yet 
such predictions might need to be modified to account for the impact of public agencies. 
Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and the Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J. L. Econ. & 
Org. 93 (1992).
33
 We are not the first to note the important role that federal and state agencies play in FERC licensing. See Kerwin, 
Transforming Regulation, supra, note _ (concluding that, among other forces, input from fish and wildlife agencies 
during the eighties led FERC to adopt more environmental conditions). Kerwin’s data and argument are generally 
congruent with ours though his focus is not on the inter-agency process as an instrument of congressional control, 
and he provides no empirical test of ECPA’s impact on this dynamic. Kerwin’s argument focuses instead on how 
FERC used traditional regulatory tools, including rulemaking and negotiation, to enlist outside agencies in its 
licensing process, demonstrating both adaptiveness and responsiveness.
34Spence, supra, does not discuss inter-agency lobbying per se, but he does note that Congress may purposely 
choose to give power to one agency over another based on what Congress knows about agency policy preferences. 
He calls this form of structural control a “distribution of power” type of control. This line of thinking suggests that 
Congress should be able to anticipate how empowering one agency might serve to check the discretion of another. 
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We expect our argument to interest both political scientists and legal scholars. A great 
deal of inter-agency communication occurs in the administrative state, most of it informal and 
relatively invisible. Yet scholars know relatively little about it. For the most part, scholars 
complain about the ad hoc and inconsistent nature of inter-agency coordination, treating it as a 
problem for the executive branch to fix, presumably through better management. Usually this 
takes the form of calls for more inter-agency task forces or greater centralization through 
oversight by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).35 But our understanding of inter-
agency lobbying as a form of lateral legislative control puts the “problem” of inter-agency 
“conflict” into a new light.
First, inter-agency conflict can be productive. Agencies with specialized expertise in one 
area can press their counterparts to modify decisions in another. Because agencies represent 
different constituencies, and adhere to different statutory mandates, the inter-agency process may 
serve as an important vehicle for interest mediation in the policy process. It may also function as 
a relatively transparent mechanism for coordinating activity across multiple agencies with 
conflicting interests. 
Second, our account suggests that inter-agency coordination need not be a uniquely 
executive branch pre-occupation. Our study shows that Congress can strengthen inter-agency 
lobbying for congressional purposes.  There are a number of reasons why Congress may do so, 
which we explain.36
Surprisingly, there is a dearth of academic literature analyzing the extent to which inter-
agency dynamics affect agency outcomes, and how those dynamics might be manipulated by 
both congressional and executive principals. Our study takes a small step in the direction of 
exploring this phenomenon. Among other things, it prompts us to ask, what are the implications 
of inter-agency lobbying for separation of powers concerns? In our example, Congress enhances 
the authority of some agencies to help it control the discretion of another agency. But this 
strategy may yield some degree of control over the inter-agency process to the president, who 
can intervene to determine how the lobbying process will play out.37 The separation of powers 
implications may be especially significant in cases such as ours, where the lobbying agencies are 
executive, and the lobbied agencies independent, since the prospects for gains in executive over 
congressional power may be greater in these cases, assuming that Congress typically has greater 
leverage over independent agencies than it does over executive ones.38
35
 Sometimes it results in structural changes within the executive branch to help the President coordinate policy e.g., 
President Clinton’s creation of a National Economic Council with representatives from Treasury, the Council of 
Economic Advisors, Labor, and others agencies to coordinate the administration’s economic policy.
36 See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 
1443 (hereinafter DeShazo and Freeman, Congressional Competition). 
37 Through a variety of tools—many informal—the president may encourage agencies to stand down when they 
might otherwise intervene to press their statutory interests, or persuade them to intervene more vigorously when they 
might otherwise see no need to do so.
38
 This assumption may be unfounded, however. As many commentators have noted, independents may, in practice 
behave very much like executive agencies even when not legally obligated to do so. For example, independents 
often try to comply with executive orders. There appears to be some variation among the independents over how 
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In addition, our point about inter-agency lobbying should interest scholars of 
administrative law and statutory interpretation for at least two reasons. As Mashaw, Strauss and 
other have pointed out, debates over statutory interpretation focus almost exclusively on judicial 
approaches to interpretation, ignoring the process of agency interpretation39 By raising the 
problem of the “reluctant” agency faced with multiple mandates, we focus much needed 
attention on how agencies resolve potential conflicts and determine their statutory missions.
While we do not undertake here to demonstrate how agencies interpret statutes in practice 
(something that would require its own empirical study),40 or to recommend how they should do 
so (which would call for an elaborate normative argument), our study illustrates some of the 
difficulties agencies encounter as they wrestle with multiple tasks assigned to them over time, 
including the need to answer to multiple principals.41
Second, scholars of administrative law and statutory interpretation should be interested in 
inter-agency lobbying because it may offer a new rationale for judicial deference. The fact that 
multiple agencies have been meaningfully involved in the exercise of discretion could be seen as 
additional rationale for deferring to the lead agency’s decision.  In cases of disagreement among 
agencies, however, there may be good reasons for the reviewing court to defer to the views of the 
external agencies, assuming they have been specifically empowered by Congress to play a 
consultative role in the lead agency’s decision making process.42
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, we explain the factors that contribute to the 
problem of agency reluctance, using our FERC case study as an illustration. In Part III, we 
explain the range of tools that might force agencies to comply with secondary mandates imposed 
on them via separate statutes passed after their enabling legislation, but we note that in the FERC 
example, each of these tools proved limited. We then explain the events leading up to ECPA, and 
the difference the statute made,introducing our argument that it was effective because it 
facilitated inter-agency lobbying. In Part IV, we present our empirical data, which supports our 
argument about inter-agency lobbying. Finally, in Part V, we discuss the theoretical implications 
of our findings, including our contribution to the literatures on legislative control and interest 
group theory. We also speculate that inter-agency lobbying may have separation of powers 
implications, and that it might affect judicial review of agency decisionmaking.  
truly independent they are in practice, and this depends on history, culture and personality as much as agency 
structure. 
39 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency Statutory Interpretation, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION, Article 9 (2002). Available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art9.  
40See Mashaw, supra at, suggesting different approaches one might use but simply does a survey of rulemakings at 
EPA and HHS to do a quick impressionistic study.
41 See Mashaw, supra note at, referring to the fact that agencies must respond to multiple principals as one among 
many examples of how agencies differ from courts in their interpretive approach.  .
42
 We thank Lois Schiffer, former Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natural Resources Division of 
Department of Justice, for raising this possibility.
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II. FERC AS A RELUCTANT AGENCY
In theory, all statutory mandates are created equal. That is, when Congress instructs an 
agency to do something (set health standards; allocate disability benefits; gather intelligence), 
and even when it tells an agency to do two conflicting things at once, the agency must comply. 
This is true regardless of when and how such mandates are passed; whether they are assigned to 
the agency in its organic statute or later on; and whether they come in the form of an amendment 
to the organic statute or in separate pieces of legislation. 
So if Congress creates a Federal Power Commission in 1920 to license projects best 
adapted to “the most comprehensive plan designed to improve the waterway…,”43 and then in 
the 1960s tells the agency to consult with federal and state agencies to ensure that dam licensing 
does not jeopardize endangered species or compromise state water quality standards, the agency 
must do it all. And in theory, congressional, executive and judicial oversight, are designed to 
ensure agency compliance. Potential sanctions for agency failure to fulfill statutory mandates 
include political embarrassment at congressional hearings, vulnerability to auditing and 
investigation, the threat of losing appropriations, and even elimination of the agency. The 
President can punish non-compliant agencies as well, through his appointment and removal 
powers, his budget proposals, and by resorting to informal political sanctions. And of course, 
interest groups can challenge, and courts can invalidate, unlawful agency action. 
How then, did FERC come largely to ignore both the non-power concerns in the FPA 
(e.g., recreation), and the specifically environmental mandates that came along later in a variety 
of environmental laws? In this section, we explain the factors that we suspect operated to 
encourage FERC’s disregard for these additional mandates. In short, we find a systematic failure, 
across all principals, to force the agency to comply with its non-power mandates. 
 A. The Enabling Act
To a significant extent, the original statute itself determined FERC’s attitude toward 
licensing. The Federal Water Power Act was passed to centralize authority over licensing 
hydropower specifically in order to promote it. Prior to passage of the Act, the Secretaries of 
War, Agriculture and Interior each had authority to issue licenses for hydroelectric projects on 
lands under their respective jurisdiction, which led to confusion and inefficiency. The FPA 
centralized authority in a single agency, the Federal Power Commission, which was to consist of 
the three Secretaries. Ten years later Congress reorganized the agency to consist of five 
commissioners independent of the three Secretaries. Congress soon after passed the Federal 
Power Act of 1935, encompassing most of the FWPA.44 In 1977 the agency’s powers were 
reassigned to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.45
43 See FPA §10(a), 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (2003).
4416 U.S.C. § 791a (1994).
45
 Department of Energy Organization Act, 1977.
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The original statutory mission assigned to the FPC was unmistakably pro-power.46 The 
Commission was given broad authority to grant licenses for fifty years to non-federal public and 
private entities for the construction and operation of hydroelectric facilities.47 The purpose of the 
law was to facilitate power production.  Prior to the FPA’s enactment, Congress authorized 
hydropower licenses on a case by case basis. President Theodore Roosevelt sought to provide 
more determinate licensing, and to centralize control in the federal government. After he vetoed 
dam related legislation that did not meet these conditions, Congress finally acted in accordance 
with his wishes.48
The FPA issued hundreds of licenses in these early years, the majority of the total 
licenses it would ultimately approve.49 During this period, and through the Second World War, 
there was a strong national imperative to generate power with virtually no consideration of 
recreational or environmental consequences.50 The 30s and 40s was known as the “Big Dam” 
era, 51 during which the Commission was concerned solely with developing hydropower to meet 
the needs of a growing economy.52 Dams were identified with progress and American 
technological ingenuity.53 At the time, relatively little was known about the harm dams could 
46
 For an early history of the FPC and a description of its organization, see, Milton Conover, The Federal Power 
Commission, Brookings, 1923 at 1-2. The FPC’s “function is to exercise general administrative control over all 
water-power sites…located on the navigable waters, on the public lands, and on the reservations of the United 
States….the commission is required to issue permits and licenses for the purpose of utilizing dams, reservoirs, 
power houses, water conduits, transmission lines, and kindred projects. It must regulate, under certain conditions, 
the financial operations of water power industries including the rates of service. It must make physical valuations of 
the properties of power enterprises, determine the character of their services, and control the operation of power 
projects. The significance of these functions is obviated by the almost inexhaustible immensity of the water-power 
resources of the United States, the growing practice of substituting water-power for steam power, and by the 
constant appearance of new inventions for the further utilization of water-power in industry….The seemingly 
unlimited uses of hydroelectric power in industry and in the rising standards of living indicates the undetermined 
volume of future water-power permits that must be granted by the Federal Power Commission, and the vast amount 
of industrial regulation that they may have to exercise.”
47
 “Licenses are issued to citizens and municipalities for the purpose of constructing and maintaining water-power 
plants, and all of the necessary accessories thereto. They are also issued for the construction of project works that 
may aid in the improvement of navigation….Practically all of the preliminary work that is required on the 
applications for permits, licenses…is performed through the Engineering Division and the engineering forces of the 
Departments of War, Interior, and Agriculture.” Conover, supra note, at 69-70.
48
 “The primary emphasis in 1920 was hydropower development…” See H.R. Rep. 99-507, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2498. “Congress generally embodied President Roosevelt’s views…” Id. at 2499. Roosevelt insisted that the public 
retain control of the waterways and that license terms be limited to fifty years. “Provision should be made for the 
termination of the grant or privilege at a definite time, leaving to future generations the power or authority to renew 
or extend the concession in accordance with the conditions which may prevail at the time.” See H.R. Rep. No. 99-
507, at 11(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. C.C.A.N. 2496, 2498, as quoted in 
49 See Kerwin, supra note_at
50 See Charles S. Sensiba, Who’s In Charge Here? The Shrinking Role of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission in Hydropower Relicensing 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 603, 619 (1999). See Richardson, supra note at 502.
51
 Richardson, supra note at 500.
52 See Sensiba, supra note. Hydropower licensing did slow somewhat in the late forties when, as Kerwin points out, 
more efficient forms of energy became commercially feasible. See Kerwin, supra at 92. But licensing would pick up 
again during the energy crisis of the seventies. See infra note and accompanying text.
53 Id.
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cause to aquatic resources and habitat.54 Environmental values had yet to take hold in the public 
consciousness, let alone in legislation. 
In section 10(a) of the FWPA, Congress gave the FPC fairly unbounded discretion to 
grant hydropower licenses. The only limitation on that discretion comes in the form of an 
instruction to prefer projects “best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing 
a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the 
improvement and utilization of water-power development, and for other beneficial public uses 
including recreational purposes….” Conceivably, this broad language might encompass 
environmental values (in both recreational purposes and in the larger category of beneficial 
public uses), and eventually courts held that it did. Still, both the legislative history and political 
context of the time make clear that recreational or environmental values were not meant to 
compete with the overriding need for licensing dams to help satisfy the nation’s energy needs.
It is not, therefore, surprising that FERC resisted considering recreational and other 
beneficial public uses referred to in § 10(a). At its inception, the FPC seems to have viewed the 
question of whether to consider non-power values under the FPA as entirely within its 
discretion.55 The agency viewed itself as the sole authority over hydropower, having been 
delegated extremely broad discretion by Congress. 
This attitude would take root in FERC and shape its culture for the next fifty years. And 
although the hydropower industry originally resisted Congress’ attempt to centralize licensing 
authority (because it feared that the free-wheeling laissez faire state attitude toward resource 
exploitation might be curbed by the federal government), it came around to support FERC.56
Though power had been centralized and the terms of licenses limited to fifty years, FERC 
adopted a pro-exploitation attitude, bestowing licenses upon virtually all applicants. A statute 
that gave the agency broad discretion and that enfranchised a clientele of powerful licensees 
would contribute to the agency’s later reluctance in the face of environmental mandates.
B. Culture and Expertise
As they interpret their statutory mandates, agencies tend to internalize a particular 
mission, develop an agency culture, and cultivate a unique expertise. FERC is certainly not the 
first agency to adopt a sense of mission that endures over time; many agencies develop strong 
identities in their early years that prove resilient to change.57  In our example, FERC clearly 
54 See supra note 11 on the harms dams can cause.
55
 “The statutory delegation of authority to the FERC to determine how a public resource will be used drew 
intellectual support from a progressive-era faith in expertise and rational scientific management….As an 
independent commission, the FERC would determine what the public interest was in dam licensing decisions and 
could do so based on sound technical studies and insulated from political pressure.” Stephenson, supra, note at 484.
56
 Richardson, supra notenote at 504.
57 See Mazmanian and Nienabauer, Organizations, supra, note 7 (documenting the Army Corps of Eingineers’ 
resistance to modifying its historical mission of building large water-resource development projects in light of the 
environmental imperatives of NEPA. Note also contemporary accounts of FBI “cops” and CIA “spooks” in 
descriptions of the different cultures of the two law enforcement agencies. See MARK RIEBLING, WEDGE: FROM 
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developed a pro-power culture. This was reflected in, and reinforced by, its internal 
organizational structure and its dependence on professional engineers. The agency’s early 
organization consisted of three sparsely populated divisions—operations, legal and accounting—
along with a more substantial Engineering Division of sixteen men, plus a number of  field 
personnel who were all engineers from other federal departments. The agency contained no 
division devoted to fisheries or recreational interests.58 Not surprisingly, the engineers’ priority 
was dam safety, not the conservation of fish and wildlife or the protection of recreational and 
aesthetic values. From the start, engineers were to play a key role in the licensing process, and 
their dominance persisted until the mid-eighties.59
Because of its deeply rooted pro-power identity, and the role played internally by 
engineers, FERC never developed the expertise necessary to competently analyze the non-power 
effects of its licensing program. Yet while hydropower was, and still is, considered an 
inexpensive and relatively clean source of energy60 dams have a significant adverse impact on 
the environment, by altering flow rates and water quality. Inadequate stream flow due to 
impounded water can destroy fish habitat and spawning areas, and can adversely affect upstream 
and downstream fish passage.61 At this time, however, there were no wildlife or fish biologists in 
the agency to introduce the possibility of mitigating the adverse effects of dams; no one to 
counter the views of the engineers; and no one to communicate effectively with their 
professional counterparts in the resource agencies. 
In particular, FERC had no familiarity with the kind of comprehensive and longer term 
planning necessary to properly protect environmental resources. Indeed, the agency had never 
conducted a general planning process for its licensing program. As with many New Deal 
agencies, it proceeded to make policy on a case by case—license to license. This incremental 
approach would prove especially damaging to riverine resources in cases where multiple dams 
were licensed in the same river basin.62  FERC simply avoided confronting the cumulative effect 
of its hydropower projects. Developing this expertise would have been culturally wrenching for 
the agency, and also enormously costly. 
PEARL HARBOR TO 9/11--HOW THE SECRET WAR BETWEEN THE FBI AND CIA HAS ENDANGERED NATIONAL 
SECURITY (2002).
58 See Conover, supra note at 75-82
59
 Early annual reports from the FPC contain descriptions of the agency’s structure, and later reports contain 
organization charts, all of which indicate that even as the Commission grew larger and increasingly complex over 
the years, its original structure remained basically the same, with law, engineering and administration/accounting at 
the center. In a an annual report from 1937, the Commission is divided into a Bureau of Administration, a Bureau of 
Law and a Bureau of Engineering and a Bureau of Finance and Accounts. See Seventeenth Annual Report of the 
Federal Power Commission, 1937. On an organization chart from the 1963 annual report one sees an Office of 
Economics, an Office of Accounting and Finance, a Bureau of Power and a Bureau of Natural Gas. See Forty-Third 
Annual Report of the Federal Power Commission, 1964.
60 See Kurt Stephenson, Taking Nature Into Account: Observations About the Changing Role of Analysis and 
Negotiation in Hydropower Relicensing 25 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 473, 474 (2000). Hydropower is a 
relatively cheap, renewable form of energy, and it does not produce the emissions associated with fossil fuels (such 
as particulates, ozone precursors and greenhouse gases).
61 See supra note at.
62 See Kerwin, supra note at.
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In the absence of strong signals to change, FERC understandably stuck with its pro-
power orientation. In the first sixty years of its existence, it denied a proposed license only 
once.63 The agency became known as a friend of the hydro-power industry and was derided for 
“never having met a dam it didn’t like.”64 Its attitude toward environmental concerns was, if not 
openly hostile, then consistently obstructionist. It appears to have viewed resource agencies with 
management responsibilities for fish and wildlife primarily as irritants.65 The agency simply 
believed that it was substituting for Congress in determining the conditions under which to issue 
licenses. Although specific sections of the FPA appeared to grant resource agencies the power to 
impose mandatory conditions on certain licenses (on Indian Reservations, for example),66 FERC 
read these provisions of the Act as if they were merely advisory. “Talk about adopting a cultural 
bias when reading the law,” remarks one insider, “FERC thought it was clearly in charge.”67 In 
short, the original pro-power statutory mandate, and the political environment in which the 
agency was created powerfully shaped the agency’s sense of mission.
C. Oversight 
1. Congressional Oversight
Of course, a statute as drafted by the enacting majority does not by itself determine 
agency behavior. Statutory language is subject to interpretation, and agencies interpret their 
statutory mandates in light of congressional, executive and judicial oversight.68 The three 
principals frequently send agencies mixed messages, and these messages can shift over time. 
Agencies must be attentive as new administrations take office; as control of Congress changes 
hands; as membership of congressional committees shifts; and as judicial thinking evolves. A 
failure of agency responsiveness can lead to repeated interventions by one or more of these 
principals, an erosion of support for the agency, and, ultimately, the imposition of constraints 
that limit the agency’s jurisdiction and discretion. 
It would have been risky, therefore, for FERC to have ignored or minimized non-power 
concerns for recreation and fisheries if congressional oversight had not consistently signaled the 
agency that power mattered most. In our example, FERC clearly received a pro-power message 
from its congressional overseers in its first few decades of very active licensing, through the post 
war period, and into the late seventies. 
63 See Richardson, supra note at 509.
64
 Interview with Ralph Cavanagh, Senior Attorney, NRDC, March 9, 2005, on file with author. 
65
 FERC did occasionally take environmental values into account, but as Spence points out, this was rare. The 
agency invalidated the Namekagon Hydro Company’s license application in 1953 on environmental grounds, 
because the project would be located on a scenic river. See Spence, supra note at n.39 and accompanying text.
66 See § 4 (e) which requires in part that licenses, “shall be subject to and contain such conditions as the Secretary of 
the department under whose supervision such reservation falls shall deem necessary for the adequate protection and 
utilization of such resource…” 16 U.S.C. §787(e) (1994).
67 Interview with Mark Robinson, Director, Office of Energy Projects, FERC, March 11, 2005, on file with author.
68 See Mashaw, supra, note 41, on the subject of statutory interpretation by agencies and how it is likely to differ 
from statutory interpretation by courts.
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Even as the environmental movement took shape and Congress began passing 
environmental legislation in the early seventies, oversight over FERC did not suddenly shift. 
Congress may have been sending the country a pro-environmental message by passing NEPA in 
1970, the modern CAA in 1970, the modern CWA in 1972, and the ESA in 1973, but the 
oversight committees were continuing to sending FERC a pro-power one.69 Indeed, right on the 
heels of passing the most significant federal environmental legislation in history, Congress 
passed a spate of energy related legislation between 1978 and 1980 that sought to respond to the 
energy crisis by reducing the nation’s dependence on foreign oil.  In 1978, Congress passed the 
Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), which created incentives for small private firms 
to undertake hydropower projects.70 The Act guaranteed to these applicants very favorable rates 
of return, offered attractive depreciation rates for tax purposes, and granted exemptions from 
time-consuming licensing procedures for smaller projects.71 Congress also amended other 
statutes such as the Energy Security Act72 and the Crude Oil Windfall Profits Act, to include 
additional incentives.73
A biologist working at FERC at the time described the package of incentives as a “license 
to print money” for hydropower.74 So profitable did Congress make it for operators to build 
hydropower projects, and so eagerly did the applicants descend upon FERC for new licenses, 
that the period would become known as the “hydro power gold rush.”75 Notably, the legislation 
had opened licensing to a new class of smaller, private applicants that were largely unfamiliar 
with the licensing process. These applicants had no experience consulting with fish and wildlife
agencies, and were not inclined to look favorably on the imposition of expensive environmental 
conditions that would cut into their anticipated profits.76
Thus, after a period of relative quiet, when virtually all of the original fifty year licenses 
were still in effect, and only the occasional new application came across the agency’s desk, the 
energy legislation of the late seventies spurred a boom in licensing activity at FERC; the agency 
received thousands of hydropower preliminary permit and development applications. The pace of 
licensing was intense, and the agency all but ignored environmental concerns.77 Legislative 
oversight was sending FERC a clear pro-power message.
69
 Our data suggests that even as late as 1986, and after ECPA was passed, members of the Senate Committee on 
Energy and Natural Resources maintained their pro-power orientation. The effect of each additional member on the 
oversight committee who is from the jurisdiction of license applicant, reduces the number of environmental 
conditions imposed on licenses. 
70Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617.
71 See George C. O’Connor, Will the Hydropower Program Revive in the 90s? 14 Energy L. J. 127, 129-132 (1993) 
(describing the terms of PURPA, and its effects).
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1982). See also regulations in 18 C.F.R. §292.101 (1986). 
72
 42 U.S.C. § 737 (1988). 
26 U.S.C. § 4994 (1982) (incorporating 10 C.F.R. § 212.54(c) (1979)) (repealed 1988).
74
 Robinson interview, supra notenote.
75 See Echeverria, supra, note at 76, quoting Representative Wyden in 123 CONG. REC. H8962.
76
 Cavanaugh interview, supra note. 
77
 O’Connor, supra, note at 130, claiming that 1471 exemption applications were filed between 1980 and 1985 and
that the Commission issued 775 exemptions during that time. “During that same period there were approximately 5, 
609 preliminary permits and 439 licesnes issued by the Commission.” 
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2. Executive Oversight
The role played by executive oversight in the story of the reluctant agency is equally 
complicated. In theory, executive oversight should work to force agency compliance with all 
applicable statutory mandates, at least for executive agencies. In practice, however, just as we 
have seen with legislative oversight, executive oversight may instead encourage agencies to 
comply with their primary mandate alone, or confuse them with mixed messages. 
And the situation is more complicated still when it comes to presidential oversight of 
independent agencies like FERC.  The President’s power over the independent commissions is 
constrained. For example, the president has limited appointment and removal power over board 
members or commissioners, though typically he has the power to select the Chair.78 Still, the 
White House can exert informal political pressure on members of independent agencies and the 
president can influence such agencies indirectly by threatening to veto legislation moving 
through Congress. 
To the extent that executive oversight has made an impact on FERC, the signaling has 
been consistently pro-power. It was a president, Teddy Roosevelt, who initially championed the 
centralization of authority over hydropower in a federal agency in order to harness a cheap and 
plentiful source of energy and subsequent presidents have followed suit.79 Through the 
Progressive era and the Second World War, successive presidents seemed to be in lock step with 
Congress: the nation needed power, and the domestic economic benefits of licensing public and 
private dams were substantial. In the ensuing years, as hydro-power became a relatively less 
important source of energy, FERC’s hydro power program slipped under the radar,80 but 
administrations seemed largely to leave FERC alone. Without providing a comprehensive history 
of the period, it seems fair to say that no White House through the Nixon administration sought 
to pressure FERC, directly or indirectly, to address fisheries and other non-power effects of 
hydropower licensing. 
One might have expected this to change in the seventies, as environmental values took 
hold in legislation. President Nixon created the EPA in 1970 and marketed himself to voters as 
the environmental President. In the early and middle part of the decade, Congress passed—and 
succeeding presidents signed—a raft of federal environmental legislation.81 However, the late 
seventies also brought the energy crisis, which renewed interest in domestic energy production 
and in developing alternatives to oil. The Carter administration supported congressional efforts 
to expand the market for hydropower by encouraging licensing of smaller private applicants. 
78 This is perhaps more significant for FERC than other agencies; among other things, the large staff works 
exclusively for the Chair. 
79 See Connor, supra note
80
 Interview with Bill Massey, former FERC Commissions, March 13, 2005, on file with author, noting that 
hydropower plays a relatively small role compared to natural gas and electricity regulation in FERC’s portfolio and 
that he was surprised at the intensity of interest in hydropower among members of the Senate Committee on Energy 
and Natural Resources during his confirmation hearings.
81
 CAA in 1970; CWA in 1972; ESA in 1973; RCRA in 1976; CAA amendments in 1977.
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President Carter signed PURPA and the related legislation that ushered in the hydro gold rush. 
The administration clearly supported the revitalization of FERC’s licensing process. 
Yet, even though there are no signs of high level pressure on FERC to accommodate 
environmental concerns during this period, line staff in executive branch agencies like the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service (USFS), the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the Forest 
Service (USFS) tried, in a less visible way, to force FERC to take its environmental obligations 
seriously. The fish and wildlife agencies intervened in FERC’s licensing process and joined 
lawsuits challenging several specific licenses. This suggests either that the Carter administration 
was sending mixed messages to FERC while trying to balance energy and environmental 
concerns, or that these resource agencies were able to act somewhat independently of direct 
White House control.  
Even during the Reagan administration, which was notoriously anti-environmental,82 the 
staff of the federal fish and wildlife agencies continued to pressure FERC. Kerwin speculates 
that because the administration was so clearly de-regulatory and pro-power, the agencies did this 
rather quietly, preferring to negotiate with FERC so as not to arouse the ire of the White House.83
Yet the agencies quite visibly continued to intervene in licensing proceedings and they 
participated in (although did not lead) lawsuits challenging the agency in court.84 Why would the 
Reagan administration, which had cut the budgets of these agencies and taken such public anti-
environmental stances, tolerate this inter-agency pressure? Perhaps they were unaware of it, as 
Kerwin suggests. Perhaps perfect control over these employees simply eluded the administration 
because of high transaction and opportunity costs. Perhaps career agency staff defied instructions 
out of frustration with the administration’s agenda. Whatever the reason, it does seem that in this 
case agency staff maintained some decisional independence from the political appointees at the 
top. 
Despite the activity of the fish and wildlife agencies, however, executive pressure on 
FERC was never public, consistent or vigorous enough to counteract FERC’s strong pro-power 
82
 The Reagan administration took office with an anti-regulatory agenda and promptly sought to weaken 
environmental regulations. See Marc K. Landy, Marc J. Roberts & Stephen R. Thomas, THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY, 1994 at 245-279. The administration appointed Ann Gorsuch, an outspoken critic of 
environmental regulation, as the EPA administrator. Upon accepting the appointment, Ms. Gorsuch said  “I took the 
job because I wanted to bring a politically conservative approach to solving the management problems of 
environmental protection." On Gorsuch’s watch, EPA personnel were reduced by 23 percent and referrals to the 
Justice Department dropped by half. She fired the head of the Superfund and RCRA programs and refused to 
comply with Congress's demand that she turn over internal Agency documents dealing with Superfund enforcement. 
She soon after resigned in controversy in 1983. See Richarrd J. Lazarus, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 
2005 at 99-106. Many commentators who were at EPA or working in environmental organizations during this period 
have referred to it as “a dark time at the agency.” See e.g., interview with Peter Wyckoff, former Assistant GC at 
EPA; Bill Pederson, former Assistant General Counsel at EPA; David Doniger, Senior attorney, Natural Resources 
Defense Council.
83
 Kerwin, supra note.
84
 Kerwin argues that the agencies preferred quiet negotiation during this period to direct opposition to energy on the 
theory that this would escape the scrutiny of the White House. Yet it is hard to believe that the Reagan 
administration wouldn’t be aware of even this softer negotiation strategy, and wouldn’t be inclined to put a stop to it 
if it could. See Kerwin, supra note at 97.
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disposition. Of course, as an independent agency, FERC might have ignored White House 
signals had they been sent, but the Commissioners would have at least paid a political price for 
doing so. And if the issue were salient enough, the White House might have gone over the heads 
of both the Commission and Congress to the public. This never happened, however. FERC was, 
as a result, left to pursue its pro-power agenda well into the eighties, while giving its 
environmental mandates relatively short shrift.
3. Judicial Oversight
Judicial review might also help to force reluctant agencies to take their secondary 
mandates seriously. As with other forms of oversight, however, judicial review has its 
limitations. In our example, FERC was able to remain a reluctant agency for a long time, despite 
mounting pressure from the federal courts. 
First, judicial review emerged as a potential limitation on FERC only in the late sixties. 
There are at least three reasons why. First, until then, the environmental movement had not 
developed sufficiently to create organized interest groups capable of maintaining litigation 
campaigns. Second, there were few opportunities or incentives for plaintiffs to sue FERC for 
failure to comply with environmental mandates given the relative dearth of environmental laws 
that provided them with causes of action. And finally, those entities with the most relevant 
expertise and the greatest chance of influencing FERC were federal fish and wildlife agencies, 
which preferred not to sue other federal agencies.85
Things began to change in 1965 with the landmark Scenic Hudson case, in which a 
federal circuit court invalidated FERC’s issuance of a license and held, for the first time, at the 
behest of environmental groups, that “recreational purposes” in § 10(a) of the FPA encompassed 
“conservation of natural resources, maintenance of natural beauty and the preservation of historic 
sites.”86 The Court held that FERC was obligated to consider the environmental issues raised by 
the intervenors, including fish and wildlife agencies and tribes, prior to issuing the license rather 
than monitoring effects afterwards, which was the agency’s practice. 
After Scenic Hudson, a variety of plaintiffs including tribes, environmental groups and 
federal and state wildlife agencies, brought lawsuits challenging virtually every aspect of 
FERC’s licensing process. Only two years later, in Udall vs. Federal Power Commission,87 the 
Supreme Court made clear that section 10 of the FPA obligated FERC to consider and protect 
fish and wildlife in its licensing decisions. FERC was admonished for failing to consider all 
“relevant factors” beyond the need for power, including recreation, fish and wildlife, flood 
85 While such suits are technically lawful, they tend to be frowned upon, especially among executive agencies.  The 
Department of Justice has a policy of declining referrals of cases in which one executive agency seeks to sue 
another. The rationale usually offered for this is the theory of the Unitary Executive embodied in Article II of the 
Constitution, which is thought to prohibit such internecine litigation. The situation between executive agencies and 
independents is more complicated, however. These lawsuits do occur, but they are still uncommon. In most of the 
lawsuits challenging FERC’s licensing, federal fish and wildlife agencies are intervenors. 
86 See Scenic Hudson v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965) at 614.
87
 387 US 428 (1967).
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control, and irrigation. The Court held that FERC was obligated to do this earlier, more explicitly 
and more carefully. 
One would think that such high profile lawsuits would have prompted FERC to modify 
its behavior, even if Congress and the executive branch had remained largely pro-power in their 
oversight. But FERC initially acted as if Scenic Hudson had never happened. And it continued to 
drag its feet throughout the seventies as the losses mounted. Indeed, FERC refused even to issue 
regulations regarding how the agency would implement NEPA. The Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ) had required all federal agencies to develop a compliance plan, but FERC took 
the position that as an independent agency, it was not subject to the CEQ guidelines.88
This is neither unique nor surprising; such behavioor is characteristic of the reluctant 
agency. Judicial oversight may, over time, affect agency behavior, but not many single cases—
and not even many handfuls of cases—can be relied upon to dramatically alter agency behavior; 
certainly not quickly. This is because agencies can engage in a strategy of trench warfare in 
which they simply defy the court’s latest holding until another plaintiff seeks judicial review of 
another decision.89 Where agencies issue one license at a time, in separate proceedings, plaintiffs 
must be prepared to challenge each one in turn, a time consuming and expensive prospect. By 
contrast, a successful challenge to an agency rule can have more far-reaching effects. 
Perhaps more importantly, most agency decisions, most of the time, go unchallenged. 
And of those that are the subject of a lawsuit, most settle. High profile cases in which a federal 
appellate court, or the United States Supreme Court, invalidates federal agency action are, 
relatively speaking (and despite the impression one gets from casebooks in law school) few and 
far between. Beyond this, under the most plaintiff friendly circumstances, legal challenges take 
years, cost money, and can be dragged out, all of which buys the agency time to continue its non-
compliance. 
In the case of FERC, the agency very likely resisted judicial oversight for a combination 
of related and reinforcing reasons. Agency officials who had internalized the pro-power culture 
and adopted the original pro-power mandate seem genuinely to have believed that environmental 
obligations were some other agency’s responsibility. Engineers, in particular, may have resisted 
and resented the expertise of the differently trained staff from other agencies; their own internal 
environmental staff remained embarrassingly small through the seventies. FERC was likely also 
responding to interest group pressure from licensees and applicants who felt that taking account 
of the environmental effects of hydropower licensing would slow the licensing process and raise 
the costs of hydro-power generation, something the country could ill afford.  And of course, any 
impetus in the direction of change would have been nipped in the bud by the energy crisis, and 
the ensuing legislation encouraging licensing. 
88
 Robinson interview, supra; Interview with Dinah Bear, Chief Counsel for the CEQ, October, 2003, on file with 
author.
89
 In these cases, the courts are invalidating a single license and not an agency rule, so they only apply to the instant 
case. While it is true that a reviewing court can, in so doing, indicate what is legally required of the agency the next 
time around, until the next license is challenged it remains valid. 
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4. Reluctant Principals? 
To a significant extent then, the reluctant agency is the logical result of reluctant 
principals. That is, until ECPA passed, neither Congress nor the executive seemed terribly 
interested in forcing FERC to comply with its secondary mandates, and this might have 
emboldened FERC to shrug off the only principal pressing for compliance—the courts.90
Sometimes, however, principals are not reluctant so much as they are unclear or 
inconsistent. For example, it can be hard to discern precisely what Congress wants of agencies; 
Congress is hardly crystal clear in its legislative pronouncements and it is not a monolith when it 
comes to overseeing delegated power. As we have argued elsewhere, an agency that in theory 
answers to “Congress” really answers to multiple principals within Congress, including the 
original enacting majority (which expresses its wishes via statutory language and legislative 
history); later oversight committees (which may, acting as a group, have their own priorities); 
individual members of oversight committees (whose influence can be separated out from 
committee averages); and members-at-large (who may also exert influence).91 Matters become 
even more complicated in the case of multiple statutes passed over time by different enacting 
majorities, overseen by a variety of committees whose membership changes.
A Congress this fractured is beset by problems of coordination. It may, as a result, send 
agencies mixed messages.92 For example, members of oversight committees may not seek to 
enforce the terms of a statute passed by an earlier enacting majority. Instead the committee may 
advance its own interpretation. But even committee oversight is not stable—average committee 
preferences have been shown to change over time.93 Moreover, average committee preferences 
tell only part of the story. Individual committee members may pressure agencies to arrive at 
outcomes that further their own electoral interests. And of course, members-at-large can 
intervene in agency processes as well. 94
When one considers the temporal dimension of the legislative process (which forces 
agencies to keep pace with changes in both legislation and committee oversight over time), with 
the complexities of a fractured Congress (which forces agencies to respond to multiple messages 
from competing committees and members-at-large), it would not be surprising to discover than 
an agency receives mixed messages. Inevitably, some statutory mandates will be overseen with 
90
 Congress was, of course, sending mixed messages during this period, which undoubtedly reflected competing 
views among members and committees with divergent interests and priorities. On the one hand, Congress continued 
to pass environmental legislation aimed at cleaning up the nation’s air, water and land, and at protecting endangered 
species. In almost all of these statutes, Congress included citizen suits to enable private interest groups access to the 
federal court. On the other hand, congressional oversight of FERC specifically seemed to be pro-energy.
91 See DeShazo and Freeman, Congressional Competition, supra note 36.
92Id.. 
93 See Weingast and Moran, supra note 31.
94
 One might think that congressional minorities are brought under control by either the floor or by parties. Of 
course this occurs to some extent but there are obstacles to perfect control. Compare Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith 
Krehbiel, Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 531 (1990) 
(discussing theory of perfect control) and DeShazo and Freeman, Congressional Competition, supra note 36, at note 
168 and accompanying text (critiquing theory of imperfect control).
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greater vigor than others. Agencies may feel that the safest course, when faced with new 
mandates and conflicting messages, is to stick with its original mission. At least one can imagine 
an agency doing so until instructed—decisively—to change. 
Executive branch oversight can be equally complicated. In theory, a president’s job is to 
execute all the laws equally. In practice, of course, this is impossible. For reasons of ideology 
and practicality, administrations always choose among competing priorities. This necessarily 
results in under-implementation of some statutory mandates compared to others. And, to the 
extent legally permissible, administrations will interpret statutes in line with their political 
agendas. There is nothing unusual or untoward about this. One administration may favor 
vigorous enforcement of environmental laws even if it slows energy production, or uphold civil 
rights even at the expense of national security concerns, while another may do the opposite. An 
administration may intentionally allow an agency to ignore some of its obligations if doing so 
furthers more important priorities. Conceivably, in some cases, an administration will simply do 
nothing in the face of such conflicts. It may prefer not to resolve conflicts between competing 
statutory mandates because of the transaction and opportunity costs of doing so. In such 
instances, the agency will be left to sort out how to address competing priorities; political 
appointees might step in only to resolve the most politically salient matters. 
What if an administration were not a reluctant principal, however? Suppose the President 
wanted to hold an agency to account for some long ignored mandates. Wouldn’t it be relatively 
easy to do so? The answer is yes, presumably, at least for executive agencies, if the issue were at 
the top of the President’s agenda. But with less salient matters (and this includes the 
overwhelming majority of the federal government’s day to day implementation of statutes) 
executive control over executive agencies, like congressional control over delegated power, is 
imperfect, and there are opportunity costs to focusing on any one problem over another. 
In theory, the President could simply direct an executive agency to comply with all of its 
legal obligations.95 But even if the White House could bring to heel the political appointees at the 
top of the agency, career staff with longer and greater experience, access to more information 
and support from both congressional allies and the press, could frustrate their objectives.96
Moreover, the analysis above applies to executive branch agencies where the President 
ostensibly exerts significant top-down control. Attempting to influence independent commissions 
like FERC would prove even more challenging.  
For different reasons, judicial review is also an imperfect oversight tool. Unlike Congress 
and the executive branch, courts deal only reactively and episodically with agency behavior. 
Unlike Congress, they cannot oversee agency decision-making on a continuous basis and must 
wait for litigants to bring cases to them.97 Whereas the executive and legislative branches can 
95
 Elena Kagan, Presidental Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
96 Why would an agency resist executive efforts at control? For the reasons suggested above—because of the 
agency’s entrenched sense of mission, or because the agency is under-resourced and/or overtasked already—or 
perhaps because congressional oversight and interest group pressure is pushing the agency in the opposite direction.
97
 Note exception of structural injunction used in class actions involving civil rights but not available in standard 
administrative review cases. 
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signal both executive and independent agencies in myriad ways, the only tool of oversight at the 
disposal of courts is invalidation or remand of agency action, both rather blunt instruments.98
And agencies can simply treat a ruling in one federal Circuit as inapplicable in others, unless and 
until the Supreme Court rules on the matter.
There are, in addition, many obstacles to litigation that limit its availability as an effective 
oversight tool. As in private law, the transaction costs of public law litigation are sufficiently 
high that many meritorious cases may never be brought; litigation is slow and cumbersome so it 
can take many years for a lawsuit to have any impact on an agency’s practices; and many 
victories in the arena of administrative law are procedural, and therefore somewhat limited, in 
the sense that the agency can fairly easily fix its mistake and still achieve its original desired end. 
And, as we noted earlier, agencies sometimes simply defy judicial decisions. This is not to say 
that courts are entirely, or even mostly, ineffective in overseeing agency behavior, or that 
“procedural” victories are not meaningful. The point is simply that judicial review, like 
legislative and executive oversight, is an imperfect source of control over the reluctant agency. 
In the case of FERC’s licensing program, all of these limitations were in evidence. The 
triggers for judicial review were limited until the passage of environmental legislation obligating 
FERC to observe numerous procedures and enabling citizen groups to access federal courts more 
readily. Moreover, even when environmental groups, tribes and agencies began to aggressively 
file suit, the total number of cases was still relatively few.99 Of those that succeeded, the 
reviewing courts generally held that FERC had committed procedural blunders rather than 
substantive errors that would have made the granting of a license arbitrary or capricious on the 
merits. Though FERC’s exclusive authority over licensing was eroding, the full impact of this 
prospect would take awhile to settle on the Commission.
In light of this history, what explains the reluctant agency? There are, it seems, a number 
of reasons why agencies may stay wed to a primary mandate while ignoring secondary ones. 
These include the original statutory mandate, which elevates some goals and enfranchises some 
interest groups over others; the agency’s sense of mission, its culture, and the professional 
orientation and expertise of agency staff (all of which flow from the original mandate but can 
take on a life of their own); the obstacles to coordination and fractured committee structure 
within Congress that prevent perfect oversight as mandates multiply; the obstacles to direct 
control by an administration over executive but especially independent agencies, which prevent 
perfect oversight as mandates multiply; and the inherent limitations of reactive, episodic and 
largely procedural judicial review. Presumably, both legislative and executive principals could 
overcome some of their control and coordination problems, but only at the expense of high 
transaction and opportunity costs. Courts are even more limited in overcoming the limitations of 
judicial review. While we cannot say definitively which of these influences has the greatest 
effect, it seems that their combination helps to explain how reluctant agencies remain reluctant 
over time. 
98
 Of course, rules may be reviewed prior to enforcement. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (pre-
enforcement review available when matter ripe and waiting until enforcement would cause hardship).
99 Cite collected data on lawsuits.
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III. RELUCTANCE OVERCOME
FERC’s reluctance to comply with its secondary mandates did begin to erode in 1984-85, 
just prior to when ECPA was passed. And though we will later argue that passing ECPA made a 
significant difference to FERC’s licensing practices, it would be an overstatement to suggest that 
ECPA, alone and suddenly, caused FERC to change course. It appears that FERC was “softened 
up” for ECPA and already moving in the direction of taking its secondary mandates more 
seriously. Why?
The answer lies in the partial victories and accretive progress in the story told above: all 
of the determinants of agency behavior began to shift at least somewhat toward pressing FERC 
to attend to its environmental mandates, even if no single principal acted forcefully or decisively 
on its own. First, as noted earlier, Congress had passed, in the late sixties and early seventies, a 
spate of new or significantly amended environmental statutes. Some of these laws imposed 
environmentally related obligations specifically on FERC (e.g., the WSRA) while others 
generally applied to all federal agencies including FERC (e.g., NEPA). Some of the new 
statutory mandates were “procedural” (e.g., to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service over 
endangered species or file environmental impact statements) while some were “substantive” in 
that they had more potential to restrict FERC’s decision making power (e.g., FERC could not 
issue licenses without state certification under the CWA). In at least one statute (the amended 
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act),100 Congress specifically tried to boost inter-agency 
coordination by requiring FERC to consult with fish and wildlife agencies prior to issuing 
licenses, and by demanding that non-developmental values be given “equal consideration” with 
power concerns.101
These statutes opened the door to inter-agency lobbying. Even before ECPA was passed, 
the resource agencies attempted to influence license applicants in the informal consulting 
process, and in many instances formally intervened to try to influence FERC. Most of these laws 
also contained citizen suit provisions that enabled environmental groups to access the federal 
100
 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666c (1988). The FWCA requires all federal agencies involved with management of natural 
resources to consult with federal and state wildlife agencies before authorizing projects and to give “equal 
consideration” to wildlife conservation in water development projects. 
101 See supra note. The conference report accompanying the legislation emphasizes that “equal consideration” is 
necessary so that FERC will give non-developmental concerns “the same level of reflection as it does to power and 
other developmental objectives….equal consideration must be viewed as a standard, both procedural and 
substantive, that cannot be satisfied by mere consultation or by deferring consideration and imposition of 
environmental conditions until after licensing. Protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife, energy 
conservation, and the protection of recreational opportunities are a potential cost of doing business for hydropower 
projects.” See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, 132 Cong. Rec. H 8776 (Sept. 30, 
1986). FERC’s most recent handbook on hydropower licensing says that enviroronmental values include, “fish and 
wildlife resources, including their spawning grounds and habitat, visual resources, cultural resources, recreational 
opportunities, and other aspects of environmental quality” and developmental values include, “power generation, 
irrigation, flood control, and water supply.” See Handbook for Hydroelectric Project Licensing and 5 MW 
Exemptions from Licensing, FERC, April, 2004 at 1-2. 
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courts more readily.102 FERC itself may have ignored or resisted these mandates initially, but in 
passing them Congress equipped third parties to hold FERC to account. 
In addition, Congress had laid the groundwork for weakening FERC’s exclusive 
jurisdiction over the licensing process103 by carving out a right for federal and state resource 
agencies to impose mandatory conditions on FERC licenses under certain circumstances. Section 
4(e) of the FPA authorized the Secretary of Interior to condition licenses on Indian 
reservations;104 section 18 afforded resource agencies the power to require fish passages.105 The 
courts ultimately interpreted these powers fairly broadly, cutting back FERC’s exclusive 
authority. 
Third, the intense pace of licensing and the apparent disregard for environmental 
concerns during the “hydro gold rush” led to a backlash. The agency’s behavior was in part a 
result of being overwhelmed by applications: its staff and budget were too small to handle the 
onslaught.106  In order to manage, the Commission took steps to shorten review times and issue 
licenses quickly.107 This, the Commission thought, was what Congress wanted. But in its effort 
to deliver results, FERC was careless:  exemptions were widely granted in perpetuity with no 
restrictions; too many projects were licensed to quickly; the agency engaged in precious little 
monitoring; and there was widespread non-compliance with the few conditions that were 
imposed.108
Simply put, the agency made some “stupid decisions that enraged a lot of people.”109 For 
example, FERC declared that concrete structures less than ten feet in height were simply not 
dams, which had the practical effect of exempting many projects from the licensing process 
altogether.110 The agency also determined that fish only swim in one direction, an interpretive 
move that had the effect of limiting the ability of resource agencies to require dam operators to 
install fish passages.111 Both of these decisions would ultimately land FERC in the federal courts, 
where it would lose resoundingly. 
102
 Of course even without citizen suit provisions, litigants could avail themselves of the Administrative Procedure 
Act section 10 in order to get standing. This was the route for bringing challenges under NEPA, which contained no 
citizen suit provision.
103
 FERC believed it had this power because the FPA required it to engage in a comprehensive balancing process, 
and because Supreme Court precedent supported FERC’s primacy. See First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. 
FPC, 328 U.S. 152 (1946) (holding that the FPA preempts state imposed conditions on licensing).
104 See 16 U.S.C. §787(e) 1994. Licenses “shall be subject to and contain such conditions shall deem necessary for 
the adequate protection and utilization of such resource…”
105 See 16 U.S.C. §
106
 “We were used to getting about 5 applications per year, and we were happy to have something to work on! All of 
a sudden there were hundreds of applications to deal with, and the staff was teeny. There were about ten 
environmental people.” Robinson interview, supra note.
107
 O’Connor, supra note at 132. 
108
 O’Connor, supra note at 131.
109
 Robinson interview, supra note. 
110 See O’Connor, “supra note at 130 (1993).
111
 Need cite.
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It is hard to overstate the effect of this overzealous response.112 The agency’s pell mell 
approach to licensing drew the attention of environmental organizations across the country, most 
of which had never before looked closely, or comprehensively, at FERC’s licensing practices.113
Up to this point, the Commission’s self-understanding was, as described earlier, rather 
imperious, and it had stirred up opposition only episodically and locally. The agency carried this 
attitude into the hydro rush period with disastrous consequences. No longer was FERC asserting 
absolute power in one isolated instance after another; now it was doing so in the context of a 
national program affecting many rivers simultaneously across the country.  “People began to sit 
up and take notice, and they asked, ‘Who do you think you are?’”114 The hydro rush had finally 
brought FERC’s licensing program to national attention. 
Suddenly, public interest groups like American Rivers115 and Trout Unlimited116 were 
scrutinizing the agency. Up to this point, no organized environmental interest groups had been 
committed to monitoring FERC’s hydropower program.117 “Public interest groups had engaged 
FERC in episodic siting fights but then they would go away. As a result, FERC Commissioners 
never had systematic contact with the groups. The groups that had organized around particular 
conflicts had no interest in FERC as an institution. And it was difficult to interest funders in 
monitoring FERC. There was no intervenor compensation.”118
In the mid-eighties, everything coalesced: three of the most important cases that FERC 
lost, Tulalip Tribes of Wasington v. FERC,119 Yakima Tribes v. FERC120  and Escondido v. La 
Jolla,121 were decided in 1984; in that same year and again in 1985, the Senate Energy and 
Natural Resources Committee held hearings on FERC’s licensing process; and following the 
hearings, Congress required that GAO monitor the licensing program.122 Not surprisingly, the 
developments in one arena seemed to influence and reinforce developments in another. 
Successful lawsuits lent support to the wildlife agencies in their dealings with FERC, and 
provided ammunition for interest groups pressing Congress to act. Of course, all of this provided 
momentum for the passage of ECPA in 1986. 123
The most important of the judicial decisions mentioned above, Escondido, interpreted the 
mandatory conditioning power in section 4(e) of the FPA to cut back FERC’s asserted authority 
112
 Robinson Interview, supra note. 
113Cavanaugh interview, supra note; Robinson interview, supra note. 
114
 Robinson Interview, supra note.
115 See http://www. www.americanrivers.org.
116 See http://www.tu.org.
117
 Robinson interview, supra note
118
 Cavanagh interview, supra note.
119 732 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1984).
120
 746 F.2d 466 (9th Cir.1984) (holding that FERC is obligated under §10(a) to consider “all beneficial public uses” 
of waterways and required that consideration to occur prior to issuing a license).
121 467 U.S. 1267 (1984)
122
 This history is recounted in Kerwin, supra note at 94
123 See H.R. REP. 99-507 at 2507-8 noting that, even after a raft of major court decisions “coming down on all 
phases of the Commission’s hydropower program…for giving inadequate treatment to environmental values….Just 
last month, again the Commission was reversed by the courts…for failure to give adequate consideration to fisheries 
and failure to prepare an environmental assessment or impact statement.”
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over licensing. The Supreme Court required FERC to accept modification conditions deemed 
necessary by the Secretary of Interior on public lands and reservations. The Court held that 
FERC had no discretion to determine the reasonableness of these modifications: “The fact that in 
reality it is the Secretary’s and not the Commission’s judgment to which the court is giving 
deference is not surprising since the statute directs the Secretary, and not the Commission, to 
decide what conditions are necessary for the adequate protection of the reservation.”124 This dealt 
a stunning blow to the agency’s position that it alone had licensing discretion. It forced the 
agency to recognize that the mandatory conditioning power accorded other agencies in the Act 
would not be read as “advisory.”125
The cumulative effect of this and the other cases in the federal courts was beginning to 
take a toll. Robinson recalls that the lawyers in the agency came to the program staff responsible 
for licensing and told them, “You’re killing us.”126 A tipping point had been reached. And the 
agency began to change.
By 1983, the Commission had already begun to develop a basin-wide approach to 
licensing, in which it would consider the cumulative effects of multiple projects, something it 
had long resisted.127 In 1984, it issued a Directive to Staff to prepare a plan for this new 
methodology, which became known as the “Cluster Impact Assessment Procedure” (CIAP).128
FERC also began to make greater efforts to encourage applicants to consult early in the licensing 
process with fish and wildlife agencies, as well as tribes and states, in order to integrate 
environmental and recreational considerations on the front end.129 The agency also began to 
develop a new policy with regard to NEPA compliance (after years of saying it was not bound by 
CEQ policy) though it was not finalized until 1988.130
124
 Escondido, supra note at 777. 
125
 Robinson interview, supra note “We realized, we were no longer in charge.”
126
 Robinson interview, supra note.
127 See O’Connor, supra note at 133-4; Robinson interview, supra note.
128 Id.
129
 Kerwin notes that as early as 1982, the agency had issued detailed regulations and guidance documents advising 
applicants to consult with fish and wildlife agencies prior to filing an application. Though the agency still left the 
consultation burden to applicants, the agency had begun, as Kerwin puts it, to emphasize negotiation and consensus 
to a greater extent in the licensing process. See 47 Fed. Reg. 38506. The consultation requirements were elaborate. 
For example, applicants first had to contact all appropriate agencies and provide them with detailed maps, designs 
and environmental analyses along with streamflow information. At the second stage, the applicant had to perform a 
variety of studies in order to determine the impact of the project. The third stage required ongoing service and 
consultation with resource agencies regarding exemptions or modifications. The purpose of the rules was to 
encourage consultation with a wide variety of agencies early and throughout the licensing process. See s.4.38. 
Kerwin suggests that as ECPA was passed, the licensing process had already come to “rely on a strategy of 
negotiation between agencies and applicants.” See also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 49 Fed. Reg. 8009 (Mar. 5, 
1984) at 8015, emphasizing that process of applicant consultation with fish and wildlife agencies must be more than 
opportunities to simply provide the agencies information. “An effort should be made to determine the types of 
studies agencies consider necessary, the information they have in hand, their concerns about the environmental 
consequences of the proposed project and their ideas about mitigation of adverse impacts or enhancement of 
resources. Areas of disagreement between applicants and agencies should be isolated, and an attempt to resolve 
conflicts should be made. Applicants should be aware that if they and the agencies cannot resolve their conflicts, the 
Commission will give weight to the agencies expertise….”
130 See O’Connor, supra note at 134.
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the agency restructured itself. It created a 
licensing office headed by the former Director of the Environmental Division, and an Office of 
Environmental Compliance headed by environmental experts rather than civil engineers.131
These internal changes represented a “cultural tsunami” says Robinson, a limnologist on the tiny 
environmental staff at the time, and now Director of the Office of Energy Projects. “We were 
plucked into management of the hydro program and told we were in charge. Hirings of wildlife 
biologists, fish biologists and other environmental staff went way up. Before this, we couldn’t 
even use terms like ‘instream flow’ and we couldn’t talk about NEPA because the Commission’s 
position was that it didn’t apply! In 83-84 there was a tectonic shift.”132
At the same time, Congress had swung into action. The initial impetus for ECPA was not 
the environmental aspects of the licensing process, it should be noted, but other features of the 
FPA, most importantly the  preference for public over private license applicants in the license 
renewal process.133 Many licenses were set to expire in the late 1980s and 1990s, and private 
utility operators were concerned that the legislative preference for municipalities in the original 
licensing process might apply as well to re-licensing. ECPA clarified that municipalities would 
retain their preference in original licensing proceedings only.134 However, federal and state 
resource agencies, and environmental organizations took advantage of the opportunity to appear 
at hearings and criticize FERC’s disappointing record on fish and wildlife considerations.135
Recall that, until just before ECPA was passed, the relevant House and Senate oversight 
committees pressed FERC to pursue its historical pro-power orientation, signaling the agency 
that it could ignore its environmental obligations with few consequences. Indeed, it fell to other 
committees in Congress, namely those with responsibility over environmental statutes (and
indeed to one especially powerful member of the House, John Dingell who had Chaired the 
Fisheries and Wildlife subcommittee of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee) to press 
for the statutory amendments in the bargaining over ECPA. This suggests that an inter-
committee struggle between pro-environmental committees in Congress and pro-energy 
committees was occurring in the background of the statutory drafting.
The House Committee Report accompanying ECPA notes that consideration of non-
power values under both the FPA and applicable environmental laws had historically been “less 
than satisfactory;” that environmental considerations had “generally given less weight than 
power production;”136 and that the FPA had been implemented with “little regard for the 
economically and socially important fishery resources of the nation.”137
131
 The agency also added environmental advisors to each regional offices and created a staff unit for public 
outreach. See Robinson interview, supra note.
132
 Robinson interview, supra note.
133
 ECPA clarified that a municipality is not entitled to a preference at relicensing; enumerated the factors the 
Commission must consider in acting on relicense applications; and specified the standard the Commission must use 
in choosing among competing applications. See Echeverria, supra note. 
134 See H.R. REPA. 99-507.
135 See Grimm, supra note at 940.
136
 H.R. REP. 99-507 supra at 2504. In his statement in support of the bill, Congressman Dingell said that, “While I 
Chaired the Fisheries and Wildlife subcommittee of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, the Federal 
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The Report goes on to note that “despite landmark environmental laws passed in the 
intervening years,” the FPA itself had remained largely unchanged. “[A]s presently written, the 
Federal Power Act itself does not specifically ensure that hydroelectric development and 
operation proceeds in a manner consistent with fish and wildlife values, although other laws, 
such as [NEPA, ESA and the FWCA] have supplemented the Federal Power Act to require 
FERC to provide greater recognition of these values.” 
And though it acknowledged changes at FERC, the Committee clearly felt the agency 
was not making sufficient progress.  “While recent Commission actions under Chairman 
O’Connor demonstrate improvement, the Commission has not always displayed sufficient 
concern for the non-power aspects of hydropower development. Moreover, as Commission 
members change so too does FERC’s attitude toward these aspects.”138
The Committee seemed intent on integrating the requirements from other statutes directly 
into the FPA to eliminate any doubt that these mandates were in fact FERC’s.139
Most importantly, the legislative history evidences a specific congressional intent to 
facilitate and strengthen inter-agency lobbying. Even though FERC was diversifying and 
promoting its own environmental staff at the time, Congress chose to strengthen the hand of the 
resource agencies that it could fairly predict—because of their own statutory missions, cultures, 
and track records—would reliably pressure FERC to pursue environmental protection and 
wildlife conservation. 
Power Commission would devise, with apparent relish, schemes to circumvent or render ineffective the Fish and 
Wildlife Coordination Act.” 133 Cong. Rec H 1996, Monday, April 21, 1986.
137 Id. at 2506.
138 Id. at 2504.
139 See 132 cong rec H 1996. Comments of Rep. Dingell: “Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 44 which 
amends the Federal Power Act to resolve a very thorny and contentious issue concerning the relicensing of 
hydroelectric power facilities. It is a fair bill. It is a reasonable bill. It is proconsumer. It is pro-environment. Just as 
important, it retains the expressed statutory preference for states and municipalities in original licensing, while 
making it inapplicable in proceedings following expiration of an existing license…I particularly want to stress the 
environmental features of the bill worked out cooperatively with all my colleagues on the committee, but 
particularly the bill's chief sponsor, Mr. Shelby, the subcommittee Chairman, Mr. Markey, and the ranking minority 
member, Mr. Moorhead….The fish and wildlife and related environmental provisions of this bill are long overdue. 
To me, they are the backbone of the bill. As the electric utility industry knows, they are one of the principal reasons 
for my supporting the bill with great enthusiasm. For too many years, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
and its predecessor, the Federal Power Commission, treated these important natural resources, including the pristine 
waterways to which they depend, with disdain and indifference. These resources have been relegated to a mere 
nuisance, rather than treated as a valuable and irreplaceable national treasure. Too often, while I chaired the 
Fisheries and Wildlife Subcommittee of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, the Federal Power 
Commission would devise, with apparent relish, schemes to circumvent or render ineffective the fish and wildlife 
coordination act. Recently, under former chairman O'connor, FERC showed some indication that this attitude might 
be on the wane. But he is gone and now some of the new commissioners seem ready to revert back to the "good old 
days." This must not happen. I believe that this bill, along with some vigilant oversight by the Energy and 
Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, which I chair, will help to assure that it 
does not.”
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The Conference Committee Report specifically adverts to this goal, describing ECPA as 
“clearly and unmistakably upgrading the status of recommendations made to FERC by fish and 
wildlife agencies such as the National Marine Fisheries Service, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service and the State fish and wildlife agencies made pursuant to the Fish and Wildlife 
Coordination Act.” ECPA is intended, says the Report, to underscore the need for both FERC 
and license applicants to work with these other agencies.140
One way to view ECPA, then, is that it merely clarified and reinforced obligations that 
FERC was already required to meet.141 Yet this is not quite right. ECPA created new burdens. 
For example, “equal consideration” of power and non-power values per se was not required 
under the FPA; the language in section 10(a) merely required the agency, when choosing among 
competing applicants, to select the proposal that presented the most “comprehensive plan” for 
the waterway. The agency was to consider not only power benefits but also recreation. It took, 
however, until the 1960s for courts to being construing section section 10(a) to require FERC to 
explicitly consider recreational and environmental values on a par with power concerns. And 
while the FWCA had required since 1934 that FERC consult with wildlife agencies, Congress 
only added the “equal consideration” language to that statute in 1958. So, while one could say 
that FERC had always formally been obligated to consider equally non-power and power values, 
and had just ignored that obligation, the more persuasive claim is that this imposition on FERC 
was of more recent vintage. ECPA cemented a relatively recent expansion of FERC’s 
obligations, one that had occurred thanks to the federal courts.142
Setting aside whether the “equal consideration” feature was in fact new, other changes 
created by ECPA were inarguably new: ECPA required that FERC itself, and not just the license 
applicants, consult with specific resource agencies; that FERC develop a dispute resolution 
process to resolve its disagreements with other agencies; and that the Commission give reasons 
for not adhering to their recommendations. As Spence puts it, ECPA raised the transaction costs 
140 See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, 132 Cong. Rec. H 87666, Tuesday, September 
30, 1986. “Under section 10(j), the fish and wildlife conditions FERC imposes for each project must be based, as 
required under present law, on recommendations made by these fish and wildlife agencies. To address concerns that 
the input from these agencies could be ignored, watered down, or undervalued, the Commission may only reject, in 
part or whole, a recommendation of any of these agencies concerning any specific project after attempting to resolve 
the difference with the agencies and after publishing a finding (and reasons therefor) that such recommendation is 
inconsistent with the purposes and requirements of the Federal Power Act and that the conditions selected by FERC 
meet the statutory standard in section 10(j)(1).”  Such findings would be subject to judicial challenge under arbitrary 
or capricious review. Id. Still, the Report reinforces that the recommendations are not mandatory requirements and 
do not dictate a particular result. The amendments are intended to ensure that FERC does not ignore them as it has 
so often done in the past.
141
 The House Committee Report on ECPA noted that “…the bill does not amend or change the Fish and Wildlife 
Coordination Act, NEPA or other environmental laws. It addresses and clarifies FERC’s procedures and decision-
making to ensure that those laws are fully met.” See supra note
142 If Congress had merely done this, we might be able to claim that the form of Congress’ intervention was 
determinative i.e., that amending the enabling law, as opposed to expressing congressional preferences in 
independent environmental statutes. But this comparison is not available to us. We conducted here an “event” study, 
which focuses on ECPA and the difference it made, controlling for other possible explanations of FERC’s behavior. 
We did not set out to compare alternative methods of congressional attempts to alter FERC’s behavior. Still, we 
speculate about this in the hopes that it becomes a fruitful area of research. See infra, note and accompanying text.
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of ignoring the other agencies.143 And ECPA put all of these obligations, new and old, in one 
place, front and center in the agency’s own statute, the FPA.
To be clear, prior to ECPA, agencies concerned about non-power values already 
participated in FERC’s licensing process through consultation with license applicants and 
through intervention in licensing proceedings. Yet, their efforts were routinely thwarted by 
FERC. Inter-agency lobbying had accelerated somewhat in the early eighties, but our data show 
that ECPA had an important booster effect. The data show that ECPA nevertheless made a 
difference to the number of environmental conditions imposed on licenses specifically because it 
intensified inter-agency lobbying. We explain our findings below.
IV. EMPIRICAL DATA
A. Summary
Against this history of FERC as a “reluctant agency” we set out to study whether ECPA 
made any difference to FERC’s licensing process. Our empirical strategy was to explain the 
number of environmental conditions as a function of a variety of influences: interest groups, 
legislative oversight,144 and local conditions such as the characteristics of the dam, the local 
power market and the local stock of natural resources, which might affect the propensity to 
impose environmental conditions.145 Controlling for these and other influences, we wondered 
what might explain the rate at which FERC imposes more or fewer environmental conditions per 
license. We discovered, to our surprise, that the most likely explanation for the rise in 
environmental conditions we observed was inter-agency lobbying.
143
 Spence, supra note at.
144
 These principals include a congressional statutory majority that altered FERC’s legislative mandate, the members 
on FERC’s oversight committees, and at-large members representing jurisdictions in which FERC is relicensing a 
dam.
145
 Local conditions can affect the costs and benefits of imposing environmental requirements on dam owners, and 
thus should affect the willingness of intervenors and legislative overseers to exert effort to block them, thereby 
reducing the chance that the agency will impose them. We focus on factors that affect 1) the social opportunity costs 
of the conditions, including the cost of finding alternative power; 2) the profits to dam owners; and 3) the costs of 
retrofitting dams. We hypothesize that where the price of replacing power lost due to the imposed conditions is high, 
FERC will impose fewer conditions. Similarly, where the price of foregone profits (due to imposed conditions) is 
high, FERC will impose fewer conditions. Finally, where the relative cost of retrofitting the dam is higher as a result 
of the conditions (e.g., when an older dam must be retrofitted to control flow, in order to protect fish life), FERC 
will impose fewer conditions. On the other hand, FERC can be expected to issue relatively more conditions for dams 
with physical aspects or modes of operation whose modification will provide larger benefits (i.e., larger and taller 
dams with greater storage capacity are likely to negatively impact the local environment relatively more, so 
modifications to these dams will have greater environmental benefits than modifications to shorter dams with 
smaller storage capacities). Dams operated in a “run-of river” mode (which provides consistent flow to fish stocks), 
rather than a “peak” storage mode (which allows dam owners to charge high prices during peak demand but which 
can “starve” fish stocks of minimum flows), are already environmentally friendly and will be associated with fewer 
conditions. Conversely, the greater the value of the environmental resources that would be protected by the 
conditions (i.e., where the dam is located on an “endangered river” or on a river containing endangered species), the 
greater the number of conditions FERC will issue.
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Our study tracks the number of environmental conditions FERC imposed on the 222 
dams the agency relicensed between 1983 and 1998.146 We focus on relicensing because this was 
FERC’s primary activity at the time (indeed it will continue to be the agency’s major focus in the 
hydropower area for the foreseeable future.147 Approximately 116 projects underwent relicensing 
between 2001 and 2005, and another 69 will do so between 2006 and 2010.148) The relicensing 
process is especially important when it comes to mitigating environmental harm because older 
dams built between the 1930s and 1950s typically included minimal conditions to mitigate 
environmental harms; they were licensed before most of the environmental legislation applicable 
today was passed and at a time when FERC was focused, as we have pointed out, exclusively on 
production values.149 Relicensing these dams without applying environmental conditions would 
be enormously destructive for fish and wildlife.150
Our data reveal that the number of environmental conditions rose strikingly following 
ECPA’s implementation and the results point to inter- agency lobbying as the explanation. 
We base this conclusion on six key findings. First, our data show that, on average, FERC 
imposed more that twice the environmental conditions in dam re-licensing proceedings after 
1990, a date by which we can be certain that ECPA had been fully implemented. (jumping from 
an average of  about five to an average of twelve conditions.) Second, our data show that public 
resource agencies representing environmental concerns intervened in FERC re-licensing 
decisions more frequently than any other groups during the period we studied (both before and 
146
 These data come from four primary sources:  the hydroelectric relicense itself, the hydroelectric relicense docket 
sheet, an internal FERC database, the 1990 U.S. Census, and various governmental records on political and river 
basin characteristics. The data consist of 222 observations of hydroelectric dam relicenses issued by FERC over the 
fifteen-year period.
147
 Over our period of study, 1983 to 1998, FERC issued over 2,400 environmental requirements for 222 dams. Over 
the next 15 years FERC will issue environmental conditions for over 1,500 dams, locking in a portfolio of power 
and non-power benefits for the 30- to 50-year lifetimes of each license. Notably, both the initial licensing and the 
relicensing process follow the same procedures, so there should be no difference between the two in terms of how 
FERC considers environmental effects. The Supreme Court has held that a relicensing application should be given 
the same scrutiny by FERC as an initial license application, with all the attendant requirements and regulation. The 
court held that “relicensing…is more akin to an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of a public resource than a 
mere continuation of the status quo.  Simply because the same resources had been committed in the past does not 
make relicensing a phase in a continuous activity.  Relicensing involves a new commitment of the resource, which 
in this case lasts for a forty-year period.” See Yakima Indian Nation vs. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 746 
F. 2d. 466.
148 See Sensiba, supra note at n.7 citing American Rivers, Facts About Hydropower and Dams 
(http://www.amrivers.org/facts.html).
149 See Lydia T. Grimm, Comment, Fishery Protection and FERC Hydropower Relicensing under ECPA: 
Maintaining a Deadly Status Quo, 20 ENVTL. L. 929 (1990) AT 931.
150
 The environmental conditions imposed on dam licensees can help to ameliorate adverse environmental impacts 
caused by dams by requiring sufficient in-stream flows for fish migration; limiting the fluctuation of  flows that 
results from storage and release at peak demand; requiring operators to build fish passage devices and to mitigate 
dam impacts on water quality and soil erosion. Conditions might also require operators to provide on-site recreation 
or to preserve historical and archaeological resources. However, because retrofitting older dams can be expensive, 
and because mitigation measures for environmental and resource protection can interfere with the production value 
of these dams, the imposition of environmental conditions remains highly contentious.
- 34 -  LAW REVIEW [Vol.    :      
- 34 -
after ECPA was passed).151 This tells us nothing in particular about the effect of ECPA, but it 
does tell us that agencies are active players in the decision making processes of sister agencies. 
Third, by comparing public agency participation before and after ECPA, we show that 
public agency participation increased after the statute was passed, climbing steadily over time. 
And after 1990 (again, a date by which the statute can be assumed to be fully operational), the 
rates of participation jump even more: the average participation of public intervenors in FERC 
licensing proceedings jumped post 1990 by 300 per cent, from an average of 3.2 public 
intervenors to an average of 10.5.152 While participation rates for all intervenors increased post-
ECPA, none spiked as much as the public agencies.153
Fourth, this public agency intervention matters. Over the period we studied, public 
intervenors had a significant impact on the number of environmental conditions imposed by 
FERC: for every additional federal agency that attended a relicensing hearing, FERC imposed an 
average of three-quarters of an additional environmental condition on the license; for every 
additional state agency, FERC imposed an average of approximately one third of an additional 
environmental condition. Fifth, the data show that the magnitude of the influence each of these 
public agencies exerted on environmental conditions increased, almost doubling on average after 
ECPA was fully implemented. Finally, when the increase in agency intervention is put together 
with the increase in the magnitude of their influence, we find that public agencies were 
associated with 60 percent of all environmental conditions following the full implementation 
ECPA, that is up from about 20 percent in the period prior to ECPA’s full implementation the 
majority of the increase in environmental conditions that followed the passage of ECPA.
Our analysis also offers two secondary insights. Controlling for the impact of public and 
private intervenors as well as for a wide variety of other possible influences,154 the data also 
show that ECPA itself, independent of its impact on inter-agency lobbying, and indepenedent of 
any other factor, caused a jump of about three environmental conditions on average. In addition, 
our data show that legislative oversight involves several competing principals, some of whom are 
associated with significant decreases in environmental conditions, while others cause an increase 
in these conditions.
While it is true, as Kerwin points out, that FERC was already increasing the number of 
conditions per license in the early eighties, the post-ECPA jump is nevertheless striking. It is 
hard not to conclude from the evidence that ECPA made a difference; that it intensified the 
underlying inter-agency dynamic. Again, to be clear, our study separates the impact of ECPA 
(meaning all the procedural and substantive changes that ECPA represents) from the impact of 
151
 Indeed, our data show that public agencies comprised 60% of all intervenors in FERC proceedings over this time.
152
 This represents the biggest absolute increase of any types  of intervenors in FERC’s licensing decisions.  
153
 The participation by all intervenors rose from an average of about five to an average of almost sixteen--a tripling 
in participation.
154 Our regression controls for a variety of other potential influences on the number of environmental conditions 
such as oversight by members of Congress from the district in which the dam is located; oversight by congressional 
committees; type and location of dam; and unique features of the river on which the dam is located. Our 
expectations about how these factors would affect the number of environmental conditions were largely borne out. 
For example, as we expected, dams located on scenic rivers are more likely to receive more conditions.
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public agency intervenors. Both are associated with a jump in environmental conditions. 
However, since the ECPA’s reforms primarily strengthen the influence of public agencies, we 
believe the primary explanation for the increase in environmental conditions is inter-agency 
lobbying. 155
Our empirical results highlight a surprisingly important role for inter-agency lobbying in 
the agency decision making process.  Federal and state agencies not only participated in 
relatively large numbers in FERC’s relicensing hearings, but also had the largest empirical 
impact on FERC’s decision-making of all the factors we considered.  And ECPA appears to have 
intensified this impact. 
For theories of legislative control, inter-agency lobbying appears to be an important but 
overlooked form of control, beyond the traditional ex ante statutory and ex post oversight 
instruments.  For theories of interest group influence, the effectiveness of lobbying by public 
agencies appears to turns conventional wisdom on its head.  Normally, we would expect local 
firms and market-oriented groups, who bear concentrated costs, to mobilize more effectively 
than other groups, such as consumers, who enjoy only diffuse benefits. However, our results 
reveal that public agencies, which are more akin to groups representing diffuse interests, are the 
most effective intervenors of all. 
Below, we explain our methodology and findings in more detail. We conclude by 
discussing the way in which the methodological limits of an event study affect the strength of our 
inferences from these data and the robustness of our argument.156
B. Public Participation in Relicensing 
Before it was reformed significantly in the wake of ECPA, 157 the traditional FERC 
relicensing process was lengthy, reactive and adversarial. The process typically began three to 
five years prior to the license expiration.158 FERC did not mediate between license applicants 
155
 To be clear, prior to ECPA, agencies concerned about non-power values already participated in FERC’s licensing 
process through consultation with license applicants,  and through intervention in licensing proceedings (which 
enabled them to challenge licenses in federal court). And prior to ECPA, courts had already (and repeatedly) 
admonished the agency to take non-power values more seriously. Finally, prior to ECPA, public support for 
environmental values had already been building for nearly two decades, and Congress had responded to that public 
sentiment by passing environmental legislation. Indeed, this provided the statutory basis for the judicial 
admonishment referred to above. ECPA built on, and intensified, these trends. 
156
 This discussion will address omitted variable bias, simultaneity/endogeneity bias, and the definition of the 
“event” in this analysis as well as other issues.  
157 It should be noted that, in recent years, the traditional sequential licensing process (through which applicants first 
consult with relevant resource agencies without FERC’s involvement and then file applications with the agency) has 
been supplanted by a new, more negotiated process that integrates environmental considerations early. See infra
note, and accompanying text.
158
 The FPA authorizes FERC to choose among five options upon application for renewal: the federal government 
can take over the project (which has never happened); FERC can issue a new license to the incumbent licensee; 
FERC can issue a new license to a new licensee (this has never happened where the incumbent licensee has applied 
for renewal); FERC can issue a temporary nonpower license which transfers the project lands to the federal, state or 
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and resource agencies, but required that they consult with each other prior to submission of an 
application.159After consultation, the applicants would prepare studies and submit the application 
to FERC. Only upon receiving it did FERC staff review the studies that were proposed by the 
applicant, and process the application. Finally, the Commission would issue the license with 
relevant conditions.160
By the early 1980s FERC adopted a liberal intervenor policy,161 allowing any interested 
party to file comments and participate in the relicensing process, providing that its interests were 
not already represented.  As a result, during the period we studied, a wide range of interest 
groups participated in FERC’s licensing process.162 These include the dam owner, local utility, 
local water-dependent businesses, Indian tribes, recreational and environmental non-profits and 
numerous state and federal resource agencies. Table 1 provides examples of the different types 
of intervenors.  
municipal government (this has never happened); or FERC can accept surrender of the license (which is rare). See
Powell, supra note at 511.
159
 “The applicant prepares the proposals, then the agencies, Tribes, and public react….” Powell, supra, note at 414.
160
 The process proceeded in seven stages and typically took 3-5 years, but sometimes much longer. At step one, the 
dam owner files an application with FERC and FERC provides public notice of the relicense application in the 
federal register and specific notice to appropriate resource agencies; at step two, the applicant and agencies engage 
in a first-stage consultation; at step three, the applicant prepares studies and a draft application; at step four, the 
applicant and resource agencies engage in a second-stage consultation; at step five, the applicant files the application 
with FERC; at step six, FERC processes the application and complies with NEPA requirements; finally, FERC 
issues the license with terms and conditions. See Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Hydroelectric Project 
Relicensing Handbook, April 1990. The process is also detailed in 18 C.F.R. §16.8.
161
 FERC promulgated regulations to revise its intervenor rules. See 18 C.F.R. pt.4 (Regulation 214 in 1982.
162 See Moore et al. There is a between an “official” and an “unofficial” intervenor which we do not recognize in our 
dataset.  Only official intervenors are entitled to file a lawsuit in the Court of Appeals challenging a final FERC 
decision, while unofficial intervenors can (and do) comment, receive information upon request, and participate in 
the negotiations. Still, unofficial intervenors have no legal authority to challenge the final outcome of the relicensing 
decision. See 18 C.F.R. § 385.214 (a)(3).
2005] PUBLIC AGENCIES AS LOBBYISTS - 37 -
37
Table 1:  Intervenor Descriptions and Examples
Sports fishing Boating Historic/Archaeology Endangered Species Power
Water Supply Recreation
Geographic
 Range
Federal Atlantic American Advisory Council American UNITIL
American Appalachian
Salmon Canoe on Historic Rivers Power
Canal Mountain
Federation Assn. Preservation Corp.
Society Club
State California Georgia Alabama WA Dept. of WI River
ID Dept. of Adirondack
Trout Canoeing Historical Wildlife Power Co.
Water Mountain
Assn. Commission
Resources Club
Local Puget Sound Shasta OR Dept. of Covelo Loup River
Tuolumne Camp
Gillnetters Paddlers Planning & Indian Public
Water Grady
Assn. Development Community Power
District Spruce
Market
Orientation
Public Pacific CA Boat- AL Historical VA Game WI Public
CO Div. of NY Parks
Fishery Mgt. ing & Commission Dept. Service
Water & Recreation
Council Waterways Dept.
Resources
Private Bumble Bee Southeastern Chippewa & Niagara
Diamond Little River
Seafoods Expeditions Flambeau Mohawk
Fruit Camping
Improvement Co. Power
Growers Resort
NGO Federation Six Rivers Fernbank Museum UT Wilderness UT Muni.
Deerskin
of Fly Paddling of Natural Assn. Power
Lake
Fishers Club History Agency
Assn. .
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C. Environmental Conditions
Because FERC has only declined to relicense one project out of 222 from 1983-1998, the 
primary focus of the relicensing proceedings studied here is the environmental requirements that 
FERC imposed in relicensing proceedings. These environmental requirements may be 
subdivided into six broad purposes: erosion control; water quality; historical and archaeological; 
recreational and aesthetic; resource; and flow. Table 2 provides a sample of various types of 
requirements.163
Conditions can be both costly and inconvenient for licensees. Examples range from less 
expensive and largely procedural requirements (e.g., that licensees monitor water quality) to 
onerous ones that restrict owner decisions in ways that will cut into profits (e.g., the maintenance 
of minimum stream flows to support fish populations).
We treat the number of environmental conditions as a measure of FERC’s attentiveness 
to its secondary environmental mandates. While we recognize that this is an imperfect 
measure—because a greater number of conditions may not always translate into greater 
environmental protection—it is nevertheless the best proxy available for measuring FERC’s 
willingness to take environmental concerns seriously.164
Table 2
Sample Requirements By Type
Erosion Control Requirements
License       Description
P-298 File an erosion protection and remediation plan
P-2397 Licensee shall file with Commission recent geotechnical analysis of 
shoreline conditions, for purposes of determining need for remediation of 
erosion
P-2360 Licensee shall file a dust and erosion control plan
P-2535 Maintain a shoreline buffer of trees
P-1267 Conduct a five-year channel monitoring study
P-2421 Plan to establish and maintain a shoreline buffer zone
Flow Requirements
P-2512 Operate project in run-of-river mode
P-2512 Install a streamflow gage to monitor minimum flow releases
P-2512 Develop a plan to set limits on the maximum rate of change in river flow
P-1957 Licensee shall act to minimize fluctuations of reservoir surface elevations
P-1773 Maintain and utilize a guaranteed priority stream flow device to 
automatically release minimum flows
P-2360 Licensee shall release bottom water from the diversion dam whenever 
possible
163
 Department of Energy, 1991, 1994, 1996.
164
 See Table A1 of the Appendix for a description of the all of the variables we use in the foregoing analysis.
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Water Quality Requirements
P-96 Licensee shall file a plan to minimize the quantity of sediments or other 
pollutants resulting from construction, that might enter project waters
P-487 Licensee shall conduct a water quality monitoring program
P-271 Licensee shall study measures to alleviate coldwater discharges from the 
dam
P-405 Licensee shall develop a study plan to look at dissolved oxygen and 
temperature levels in project reservoir
P-405 Licensee shall conduct a study for disposition of river-borne debris
P-459 Licensee shall take necessary measures for control of vectors at the project
Resource Requirements
P-120 Licensee shall survey lands for presence of any endangered species
P-503 Develop a plan to ensure protection of raptors from electrocution
P-2520 Install upstream fish passage facilities
P-2520 Install downstream fish passage facilities
P-18 File a plan to monitor the golden eagle nest near the project site
P-663 Monitor habitat aquatic species populations in bypassed reach
P-2468 Licensee shall provide annual monetary contributions for fish losses due to 
turbine entrainment mortality
P-2580 File a plan to monitor existing wetland habitat
P-460 File an Estuarine Enhancement Plan
 Historical & Archaeological Requirements
P-1413 Consult and cooperate with the State Historic Preservation Officer
P-2428 File a cultural resources studies and management plan
P-1267 Manage historic properties
P-1889 Consult with the SHPO to determine any necessary historic or 
archaeological mitigation measures
Recreational & Aesthetic Requirements
License      Description
P-96 Licensee shall submit a plan to minimize any disturbances to the natural, 
scenic, historical, and recreational values of the project
p-1889 Licensee shall consult with agencies in the development of park areas to 
provide for optimum public utilization and recreation needs of project area
P-935 Licensee shall provide recreational facilities
P-935 Licensee shall provide boat access and launching facilities
P-1235 Licensee shall construct a small boat launch/take out facility and a paved 
canoe portage path; consideration shall be given to handicapped in the 
recreation facilities
P-6032 Bury a transmission line, for visual and recreational reasons
P-1394 Licensee shall fund two access trails
P-2486 Implement a telephone hotline on daily flows
D. Findings
1. FERC imposed more that twice the environmental conditions in dam re-licensing 
proceedings after ECPA had been fully implemented.
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Table 3 presents the average number of environmental conditions included in licenses 
each year. We see that before ECPA’s implementation a FERC license had an average of 4.8 
conditions, while after ECPA’s implementation this number increased to 12 conditions.165  There 
may be many reasons for this increase. There may have been changes over time in the 
characteristics of both the rivers and the dams up for relicensing. The implementation of ECPA 
may have changed the preferences of FERC. There may also have been changes in the types and 
numbers of interest groups that participated in relicensing and changes in the legislative 
oversight of FERC.   
Table 3 
Environmental Conditions per License by Year
Pre-ECPA  (1982-1990) 4.8
Post-ECPA (1991-1998) 12.0
1982 2.2
1983 4.8
1984 2.3
1985 4.3
1986 6.0
1987 8.0
1988 5.3
1989 4.3
1990 3.7
1991 11.3
1992 9.4
1993 8.8
1994 11.1
1995 13.2
1996 13.4
1997 14.1
1998 15.2
2. Public agencies represented the largest number of intervenors.
In Table 5 we present the propensity of organizational types to participate as intervenors. 
Perhaps most surprising is the distribution of intervenors across organizational types (see the far 
165
 Even if one assumes that ECPA was immediately implemented following passage, the upward trend in 
environmental conditions is still clearly observable and our results would not change significantly.
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right column of Table 3). The highlighted figure indicates that FERC will face far more public 
sector intervenors (60% of the total) than private sector (19%) or non-profit (21%) intervenors. 
In fact, the average number of state agencies (3.0) and federal agencies (3.4) participating as 
intervenors outnumbered private sector (2.5) and non-profit (2.7) intervenors put together.  
Table 5
Interveners by Geographic Scope and Type of Organizationa
Local
Avg. (row %)
State
Avg. (row %.)
National
Avg. (row %)
Total
Avg. (column %)
Private Sector 1.6 (64%)* 0.5 (20%) 0.4 (16%) 2.5 (19%)
Non-profit Sector 0.8 (30%) 0.7 (26%) 1.2 (44%) 2.7 (21%)
Public Sector 1.5 (19%) 3.0 (38%) 3.3 (42%) 7.8 (60%)
Total 3.9 (30%) 4.2 (32%) 4.9 (38%) 13 (100%)
a. Based on the 222 licenses issued between 1983 and 1998 with an average of 12 intervenors per license.  
*Includes dam owner as an intervenor. 
Local private sector intervenors (comprising 64% of private sector intervenors) are 
significantly more prevalent than state and national private sector intervenors (comprising 20% 
and 16 % of all private sector intervenors, respectively). State and national public sector 
intervenors are significantly more prevalent (at 38% and 42% of the total public sector 
intervenors, respectively) than are local public agencies (comprising only 19% of the public 
sector intervenors). We find non-profit intervenors at all three geographical levels; local (30%), 
state (26%) and national (44%). 
3. ECPA is associated with an increase in the total number of intervenors but the increase 
in absolute numbers is, by far, the greatest for public agencies.
Table 5 shows that the average number of intervenors per licensing increased 
substantially after ECPA was implemented in 1990. Moreover, the greatest absolute effect was 
for public intervenors. Even though there was an upward trend in the data before ECPA was 
passed, the post-ECPA jump is quite striking: a 300 percent increase in public agency 
participation (from an average of 3.2 to an average of 10.5 participating agencies). 
Table 5
Types of Interveners per License by Year
Total
Public 
Agencies
Non-
Profits
Private 
Sector
Pre-ECPA 1982-1990 4.9 3.2 0.5 1.2
Post-ECPA 1991-1998 15.6 10.5 3.3 1.9
Year
1982 2.0 1.7 0.0 0.3
1983 16.4 7.2 1.8 7.4
1984 1.7 1.3 0.3 0.0
1985 2.8 1.8 0.8 0.3
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1986 4.3 3.8 0.2 0.3
1987 3.8 3.4 0.4 0.0
1988 4.4 3.7 0.1 0.6
1989 6.0 3.9 0.6 1.5
1990 2.3 2.3 0.0 0.3
1991 10.7 9.3 0.3 1.7
1992 33.2 22.1 5.1 6.1
1993 6.5 5.3 0.8 0.5
1994 11.2 8.1 3.0 0.3
1995 11.5 8.5 2.5 0.5
1996 20.3 9.7 6.5 4.2
1997 14.1 9.5 3.2 1.4
1998 17.4 11.1 5.1 1.8
4. Federal and state agencies have the largest overall influence on FERC’s propensity to 
issue environmental conditions. The influence of public agencies on environmental conditions 
appears to have doubled with the passage of ECPA.  
In Table 6, we seek to explain changes in the number of conditions per license as a 
function of several factors including dam and river characteristics, intervenor characteristics, 
legislative oversight and other regional factors. Model 1 reveals the relative influence of the 
different intervenors over the entire study period. Note that, as highlighted in Model 1, 
FEDERAL PUBLIC has the largest estimated coefficient (0.78). This means that the presence of 
an additional federal agency intervenor is associated with three-quarters of an additional 
environmental condition on average. STATE NONPROFIT appear to be the second most 
influential intervenor with an estimated coefficient of 0.64, followed by STATE PUBLIC with a 
estimated coefficient of 0.37.166 These results are consistent with our expectations that federal 
and state agencies support environmental conditions. Federal and state resource agencies have 
been the most influential types of intervenors, with federal agencies being about twice as 
influential as state agencies.167
Combined with the results in Table 4, we can calculate the combined effect of federal and 
state agencies on FERC’s propensity to attach environmental conditions to relicenses.  To 
calculate the total influence of each type of public agency, we  consider the average number of 
participants (presented in Table 4) in conjunction with their marginal effect (presented in Table 
6). This is captured in the simple calculation below.  
166
 Not surprisingly, LOCAL PRIVATE and LOCAL NONPROFIT are (-0.54) and (-0.45), respectively. The 
presence of an additional intervenor of either of these types is associated with one-half fewer requirements on 
average.
167
 STATE NONPROFIT and LOCAL NONPROFIT are both statistically significant; yet STATE NONPROFIT is 
positively correlated with requirements, while COUNTY NONPROFIT is negatively correlated. This is consistent 
with county level non-profit intervenors representing the interests of local communities that bear the cost of higher 
energy costs, while state level intervenors represent those consumers who enjoy the upstream, downstream, and the 
pure public goods provided by the environmental requirements. Finally, COUNTY_PRIVATE is significant and 
negative as expected.
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On average, 3.3 federal agencies and 3 state agencies attend a relicensing hearing (see 
Table 4). Thus, the average total effect of federal agencies per license is (3.3 federal agencies ×
.78 of a condition) 2.54 additional environmental conditions. The average total effect of state 
agencies per license is (3 state agencies × .33 of a condition) 1.11 additional environmental 
conditions. The average total effect of federal and state inter-agency lobbying is (2.54 + 1.11) 
3.65 environmental conditions over the entire time period.168
While this analysis shows that federal and state agencies were the most influential types 
of intervenors over our entire study period, for our argument the larger question remains: did the 
implementation of ECPA substantially increase their influence relative to other intervenor 
groups?  To explore answers to this question, we examine Model 2 in Table 6.  Model 2 enables 
us to measure the influence of the major intervenor groups (i.e., public, private and non-profit) 
before and after ECPA’s implementation. 
Within Model 2, the coefficient on PUBLIC AGENCIES measures the influence of each 
agency before the implementation of ECPA.  Before ECPA’s implementation, the involvement 
of each agency increased the number of conditions by one-third (0.301).  This reveals that even 
before ECPA’s implementation, public agencies had the largest possible influence on FERC’s 
propensity to issue environmental conditions.  The variable ECPA*PUBLIC measures the 
additional incremental impact of passing and implementing ECPA on the influence of each 
agency.  The coefficient’s sign (which is positive) and size (which is 0.396) indicate that ECPA’s 
implementation meant that each agency exerted additional influence associated with over one-
third of a condition.  Therefore the total influence of each agency after the implementation of 
ECPA was (0.306+0.394=0.700), almost three quarters of a condition.  This represents a 
doubling of public agencies’ influence as a result of ECPA.  No other intervenor group had as 
much influence before ECPA was passed and implemented. Nor did any other intervenor group 
gain as much influence as did public agencies as result of ECPA. 
As mentioned earlier, the addition of more environmental conditions will not necessarily 
lead to greater environmental protection; this depends in part on how well the conditions are 
designed, and the extent to which they are implemented and enforced. In theory though, 
conditions are designed to mitigate the adverse environmental impacts of dams, which is why we 
used them as a proxy for FERC’s attention to environmental mandates.169
It is possible, of course, that FERC is simply increasing the number of relatively cheap, 
easily performed requirements, while decreasing more costly and environmentally protective 
168
 For the other intervenors with significant coefficients, their average total group influence is STATE 
NONPROFITS (0.70×0.64=) 0.45, LOCAL PRIVATE (1.57×-0.54=) -0.85, and LOCAL NONPROFIT (0.83×-
0.45=) -0.37.
169
 Some conditions may be badly designed; some might be well designed but poorly implemented. Our study does 
not measure the effectiveness of the measures adopted but assumes that the number of environmental conditions 
imposed on licenses is an appropriate dependent variable if one is concerned about how seriously FERC takes its 
environmental obligations. Generally speaking, we think it reasonable to assume that adopting more environmental 
mitigation measures will be better for the environment than adopting fewer such conditions.
- 44 -  LAW REVIEW [Vol.    :      
- 44 -
ones. For example, minimum flow requirements are among the most expensive because they 
deprive dam owners of the ability to store water for sale in periods of peak demand.170 The data 
show when flow requirements increase, such as those forcing owners to operate dams in what is 
called “Run of River” mode, the number of other conditions fall by more than one.171 Perhaps in 
some instances, FERC is doing the reverse: substituting fewer, more costly requirements for a 
greater number of inexpensive ones.172 The data do show, however, that both expensive and 
inexpensive requirements increase after ECPA’s passage and implementation. Moreover, even if 
ECPA did result in a greater number of inexpensive restrictions at the expense of fewer costly 
ones, it would not undermine our claim that the imposition of more conditions is a sign of 
effective inter-agency lobbying. Nor would it undermine our claim that the lobbying and 
resulting conditions can be a means of legislative control over FERC; even inexpensive 
conditions provide the basis for agencies and interest groups to oversee and challenge FERC’s 
implementation as well as dam owner compliance, if necessary.  
5. The incremental influence of public agencies increased after the passage of ECPA. 
To appreciate the overall influence of public agencies before and after the 
implementation of ECPA we consider the increases in both their participation and their 
influence.  Before EPCA was implemented an average of 3.2 public agencies participated (Table 
5), each having an average influence of 0.301 conditions (Table 6, Model 1).  These public 
agencies are associated with a total effect of 0.96 conditions out of an average of 4.8 total 
conditions (Table 3), or about 20 percent of all conditions.  After ECPA’s implementation, an 
average of 10.3 public agencies participated (Table 4) with an average influence of 0.700 
conditions (Table 6, Model 1).  These public agencies were associated with 7.3 conditions out of 
a post-ECPA average of 12.0 conditions in total (Table 3), or about 60 percent of all conditions.  
This pre- and post-ECPA comparison requires careful interpretation.  Our analysis clearly 
suggests that the increase in public agency influence is associated with ECPA (Table 6, Model 
1); however, we cannot attribute the significant increase in public agencies’ participation (Table 
5) solely to the ECPA.  Still, even if only one half, or even one quarter, of the increase in 
participation is due to ECPA, it would have had a substantial influence by facilitating inter-
agency lobbying.  
E. Secondary Findings
5. The passage and implementation of ECPA itself, independent of any other factor, 
caused a jump in environmental conditions.
170
 A dam operated in “peak mode” releases water in response to demand for irrigation or power. Such draw-downs 
can lead to dramatic fluctuation in water levels. Minimum stream flows limit the harm done to downstream fish as a 
result of this method of operation.
171
 That is, the marginal coefficient is both negative and significant.
172 It makes sense that the imposition of some expensive requirements obviates the need to undertake others (i.e., 
flow requirements that enable fish to swim upstream make other requirements less necessary).
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As reflected in Table 6, ECPA’s passage did have an impact on the number of 
environmental conditions. We included in our model a dummy variable, ECPAD, which 
indicates whether a project was relicensed after January 1, 1990.173  This variable is positive and 
highly significant. The coefficient ranges from 2 to 3, indicating an average increase in 
requirements.  
To be clear, this result is independent of the effect ECPA had on inter-agency lobbying. 
ECPA’s mere passage and implementation causes this jump. We cannot say, however, which 
feature of ECPA is responsible for it. As we noted above, the statute included a number of 
reforms including: requiring FERC to consult directly with environmental agencies; requiring 
FERC to give reasons for not following those agencies’ recommendations regarding conditions; 
and specifying that power and non-power values were to receive “equal consideration.” We can 
say only that, collectively, these changes caused an increase in environmental conditions. To put 
a fine point on it, even if no public agency intervened in a FERC relicensing, ECPA would have 
this effect. Moreover, because of our controls, we can say that ECPA would have this effect even 
in the absence of legislative oversight.
2. To fully explain FERC’s decision making, we need to track both legislative oversight 
and the effect of intervenors. 
a. Statutory preferences: ECPA increased the total number of environmental 
requirements by an average of 3.0 to 3.5.  We discussed this variable above.
b. Oversight committee preference decreased the number of environmental requirements 
In the Senate, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources oversees FERC.  
Members who self-select onto this committee tend to have a policy interest in energy 
development (coal, oil and natural gas) and the regulation or deregulation of energy markets.  
173
  While the Act was passed in 1986, we choose 1990 to represent a date by which we could be certain that the 
Act’s effects would be fully incorporated into a license.  We made this decision based on a number of 
considerations.  First, the relicensing process typically begins three to five years prior to FERC’s approval of the 
license. Thus, when ECPA was passed, a number of relicense applications would have been in the pipeline. In an 
interview, Mark Robinson, who personally negotiated the first post-ECPA license application, reports that the 
agency complied with ECPA virtually instantaneously because FERC was, in response to the barrage of lawsuits in 
1983-4, already moving in the direction of greater and earlier consultation with fish and wildlife agencies. Yet, it is 
hard to imagine that all of the pending licenses could have been immediately adapted to conform to ECPA’s new 
requirements in such a short time.  Other commentators have suggested to us that the transition from the pre-ECPA 
process to the post-ECPA process took some time.  The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 1984, requiring license 
applicants to consult directly with the resource agencies, was somewhat slow to take effect. Moreover, FERC did 
not even issue its own regulations implementing ECPA until 1998 and 1989. See Hydroelectric Relicensing 
Regulations Under the Federal Power Act, 54 Fed. Reg. 23756 (May 17, 1989); Regulations Governing Submittal of 
Proposed Hydropower License Conditions and Other Matters, 56 Fed. Reg. 23108 (May 8, 1991). While we 
recognize that rule promulgation may lag behind internal agency behavior and that some of these regulations 
confirmed and clarified practices already adopted by the agency, we are hesitant to suggest that the statute was fully 
operational before these rules were promulgated. So, to remove any doubt, we selected 1990. However, regardless of 
the year one selects, the trend toward increased environmental conditions post-1986 is consistently positive. 
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They also tend to come from coal and oil producing states that are often not supportive of 
environmental regulation. As a result, we would expect these members to be, on average, pro-
energy and anti-environmental protection. Even if that weren’t their orientation, recall that 
environmental conditions impose concentrated costs on dam owners, while providing only 
diffuse benefits. This by itself may explain why, on average, a committee member would oppose 
them.
Consistent with our expectations, our data show that oversight is negatively correlated 
with environmental conditions. We use SENATE_COMMITTEE, as a dummy variable 
indicating whether at least one of the senators, at the time of relicensing, was a member of the 
oversight committee.  The coefficient on this variable is negative and significant.174  In Table 6, 
models 1 and 2, the estimated coefficients range in size from -1.9 to -2.2, suggesting that 
oversight committee influence reduces environmental conditions by 18% to 21% on average.175
c. Non-committee member oversight of FERC varied with the extent of their 
environmental preferences as measured by LCV scores. 
We also isolated the effect of members of Congress who were not on the oversight 
committee. These members-at-large can influence FERC through direct or indirect pressure. 
They may be compelled to influence FERC when the agency relicenses a dam within their 
jurisdiction. In order to measure their influence, and see whether it varied with their 
environmental commitments, we needed some indication of member preferences for 
environmental protection.  As a proxy for how “pro-environment” a member is we used the 
League of Conservation Voters (LCV) score.176
As we see in Table 6, the coefficient on this variable is positive and highly significant.  
Across models 1 and 2, the size of the estimated coefficient (when significant) ranged from 2.9 
to 3.4. Shifting the Senators’ average LCV score from its lowest possible level (0) to its highest 
level (1.0) increased the number of environmental conditions by 27% to 32%.177  This suggests 
that individual members of Congress do intervene to influence FERC decision making, that their 
intervention has an impact, and that the effect of their intervention varies with their commitment 
to environmental protection. This result is not surprising. As with the findings on legislative 
oversight, this result does help to show that our study controlled for a range of influences on 
FERC and that the effect of these influences (e.g., legislative oversight associated with fewer 
environmental conditions; member oversight associated with more or fewer conditions 
depending on LCV score) conforms to our intuitive expectations.
174
 It is significant at the 5% to 10% levels and jointly significant at the 1% level.
175
 This is based on the average number of conditions over the entire study period of 10.4. See Table A1.
176
 The League of Conservation Voters score is a rating between 0 and 1 for environmental sensitivity (0 being none, 
1 implying extreme environmental sensitivity).  Republicans have had lower League of Conservation Voters scores 
than Democrats, and Eastern states have had much higher scores than Western states.  For the Year 2000 scorecard, 
Republicans in the Senate averaged a score of 0.12, while Democrats averaged 0.79. To construct the LCV_SCORE 
variable, we averaged the League of Conservation Voters score for the two senators in Congress from the state 
within which a project is located in the year that the project was up for relicensing.
177 See supra note 
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Table 6:
Ordinary Least Squares Model
Explaining the Total Number of Environmental Requirements
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Constant 5.644*** 4.039***
(1.865) (0.9663)
Interest Groups
Private Owner 0.474 0.8992
(0.609) (0.6197)
Multiple Owner -0.734 -0.8376
(0.690) (0.6774)
Federal Public 0.782***(E)
(0.141)
State Public 0.368***(E)
(0.139)
Local Public 0.095(E)
(0.060)
Federal Non-Profit -0.026(E)
(0.250)
State Non-Profit 0.642**(E)
(0.267)
Local Non-Profit -0.454*(E)
(0.251)
Federal Private 0.234(E)
(0.389)
State Private 0.137(E)
(0.340)
Local Private 0.548*(E)
(0.291)
Public Agencies 0.306**
(0.0933)
ECPA* Public 0.394**
(0.0843)
Non Profit -0.0211**
(0.113)
ECPA*Non Profit 0.0310***
(0.132)
Private -0.125
(0.135)
ECPA*Private -0.623
(0.2623)
Legislative
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Principals
ECPAD 3.444***(F) 2.2503*
(0.723) (1.024)
LCV Score 3.426**(F) 2.942**
(1.452) (1.587)
Senate Committee -2.237***(F) -1.9246**
(0.740) (0.792)
Local
Conditions Dam Height 0.015***(G) 0.0186***
(0.006)      (0.005)
kW/103 -0.044***(G) -0.005***
(0.013) (0.002)
Electricity Price 0.630***(G) -0.780***
(0.238) (0.268)
kW*Elec. Price/106 13.8***(G) 14.34***
(4.46) (3.32)
Concrete 1.008*(G) 1.507*
(0.559) (0.659)
Dam Year -0.013(G) -0.012
(0.012) (0.011)
Run-of-River -1.11*(G) -1.71*
(0.578) (0.660)
NERC-West 1.510(G) 1.980
(1.003) (1.256)
NERC-East -0.933(G) -0.833
River (0.740) (0.631)
Characteristics
Endangered River 2.312*** 2.614***
(0.685) (0.735)
Adj R2 0.618 0.538
(E) Joint significance test:  F(9, 197)=9.62, Prob>F=0.0000***
(F) Joint significance test:  F(3, 197)=17.63, Prob>F=0.0000***
(G) Joint significance test:  F(9, 197)=6.22, Prob>F=0.0000***
In summary, our study measures a variety of influences on FERC’s licensing decisions, 
including legislative oversight and intervention by interest groups. We make further refinements 
within each category. For example, we break the oversight variable into statutory directives, 
committee oversight and member-at-large influence. And within the category of intervenors, we 
isolate the influence of public agencies versus private interest groups so that we are able to 
compare the two. (Indeed, we go still further within the public agency category, to separate the 
relative influence of federal versus state agencies.) Of the studies we have found of FERC’s 
licensing process,178 our study is unique in this regard.179 Our methodology helps to make clear 
178 See e.g., Spence, supra note 29, and Kerwin, supra note 28.
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that the only way to fully explain FERC’s propensity to add environmental conditions in a 
relicense hearing is to consider all of these influences together.
F. Study Design
Among research methods, our analysis is an event study. We compare agency influence 
before and after an event in order to infer the effects that ECPA had on the ability of collateral 
agencies to affect the environmental conditions prescribed by FERC.  There are several issues 
that may attenuate our ability to infer ECPA’s impact on the influence of collateral agencies. We 
discuss these below.
1. Missing factors that explain environmental conditions.
Table 6 reflects that we controlled for a variety of factors that might influence the number
of environmental conditions imposed per license. These controls include a host of “local 
conditions” that would make the addition of environmental restrictions more or less likely. These 
include, among other things, the price of purchasing alternative electricity; the value of foregone 
profits to dam owners; the age and physical characteristics of the dam; its location; and the value 
of the natural resources it affects. The results confirm most of our expectations with regard to 
these influences, and further bolster our confidence in our findings about the influence of public 
agencies.180 In addition, we controlled for presidential party over the period studied; whether the 
administration is Republican or Democrat makes little difference.
Nevertheless, while we developed as comprehensive a model as possible, there remains a 
chance that unobservable factors explain the rise in the number of environmental conditions. 
Perhaps a background trend in rising preferences for environmental protection caught the public
agencies and FERC up in its sweep.  Our concern is that this omitted factor is positively 
correlated with the number or influence of intervening public agencies over time.  If so, then our 
models’ measurements of the influence of public agencies could be biased upward. 
Ideally, we would answer this objection in one of two ways.  First, we could include this 
omitted variable.  Second, we could compare FERC’s decision making with that of another 
agency with obligations like FERC’s (i.e., to impose environmental conditions under certain 
circumstances) but which was not affected by ECPA.181 We would track the comparison 
agency’s decision making pre- and post-1990, as we did with FERC, and see if it too experienced 
an increase in pro-environment decisions. If not, we would have even greater confidence that 
ECPA was responsible for the rise in environmental conditions.
Though we did not formally construct a comparison case, there does not appear to be a 
dramatic and consistent trend, either in Congress or among federal agencies during the period we 
179 Cf. Spence, supra note 29, and Kerwin, supra note 28.
180 See note 89 supra.
181
 This statistical approach is called a “difference in difference” approach.  It measures the difference in the policy 
making between two agencies and then measures over time the difference in that “between-agency difference” 
caused by some event.  
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studied, that would explain the rise in environmental conditions beginning in 1990. Congress did 
not generally demonstrate a “pro-environment” bias during the period we studied. While 
Congress did pass some statutes enhancing environmental protection (including toughening the 
requirements for land deposition of hazardous waste),182 it weakened other statutes. For example, 
the 1986 amendments to CERCLA softened the burden of liability for hazardous waste cleanups 
by adding an innocent purchaser defense; and the 1987 amendments to the ESA generally 
weakened protection of endangered species.183
In 1990, the most significant environmental legislation passed consisted of major 
amendments to the Clean Air Act. But these contained a mix of measures, some good for the 
environment and some less so (e.g., tightening pollution control requirements in the dirtiest areas 
of the country, but also extending deadlines for compliance) along with some measures that were 
new experiments (e.g., the acid rain trading program). On the face of it, this legislation would 
have been more likely to lead to a drop in EPA enforcement actions rather than a jump, because 
states in violation of the old deadlines for compliance would now have a reprieve.184 So while it 
is true that the total amount of environmentally protective legislation and regulation has risen 
dramatically over the last forty years, during the period we studied there was no dramatic 
increase. Instead there were periods of advancement and retrenchment. Thus, FERC’s changed 
behavior after 1990 does not seem to follow from a clear and consistent signaling by Congress 
that environmental protection mattered.
Similarly, there seems not to be a general, powerful trend among environmental agencies 
during this period to more vigorously enforce environmental regulations. Indeed, as noted 
earlier, throughout the 1980s, the Reagan administration cut the budgets of the environmental 
and natural resource agencies. And the appointment of Ann Gorsuch as EPA Administrator in 
President Reagan’s first administration resulted in systematic de-regulation and a retrenchment 
in enforcement efforts. Indeed, under her tenure, referrals from the EPA to the Department of 
Justice dropped by half.185 In 1990, under President George H.W. Bush, the budgets of the 
resource agencies did not dramatically increase.186
To be clear, there may be a measurable upward trend in “pro-environment” attitudes 
among the public over the last forty years.187 Surely a growing environmental awareness 
182 See, e.g., Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-
6991(i). 
183
 In 1978, Congress added language to §4 of the ESA (the “No Jeopardy” provision), making it harder to meet the 
test for determining that an agency-supported project would jeopardize the continued existence of a species (which 
the Act prohibits). Congress also amended the statute to create a committee of high level government appointees 
with the authority to exempt certain projects from the section 7 “no jeopardy” prohibition if the actions meet certain 
criteria. In 1986, Congress passed SARA to amend CERCLA and make a third party defense available to innocent 
purchasers of contaminated property if they meet certain criteria. See §107(b)(3) and §101(35)(b).
184
 Moreover, the more stringent permit requirements imposed in non-attainment zones would take some time to 
implement, and then some time to violate, so any spike in enforcement actions related to these would not be 
expected to occur for some time to come.
185 See supra note at.
186 See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (1990).
187 See, e.g., Riley E. Dunlap, Trends in Public Opinion Toward Environmental Issues: 1965-1990, in AMERICAN 
ENVIRONMENTALISM (Dunlap and Angela G. Mertig, eds., 1992).
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prompted new environmental legislation. Still, we are dubious about the claim that such a 
general and incremental trend fully explains the post-1990 jump in FERC’s willingness to 
impose environmental conditions on hydropower licenses. 
2. An outside process simultaneously affects the influence of public agency participation 
and conditions issued by FERC.  
Another, somewhat technical, concern is what is called simultaneity or endogeneity 
bias.188  Conceptually, the concern is that some causal process simultaneously affects both the 
influence of intervenors and the number of environmental conditions that FERC issues.  If this is 
true, our estimates of the influence of intervenors may be biased in Table 6.  We address this 
concern by directly testing for the exogeneity (or conversely the edogeneity)  of the intervenor 
variable.  See Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix for details.  We can reject the hypothesis that 
the intervenor variable is endogenous.  Nonetheless we acknowledge that this is still a valid 
concern largely because tests of exogeneity/endogeneity are relatively weak. Still, even if it 
partially affects our results, we it should not undermine our ultimate claim that ECPA intensified 
inter-agency lobbying. 
3. An expansive definition of the event.  
We concede that ECPA does capture what might be described as a background trend in 
the direction of greater environmental protection. Without a growing demand for environmental 
protection, it is hard to imagine Representative Dingell or any other member of Congress 
pressing for ECPA in the first place; the electoral rewards would have been too few. As 
described above, momentum for this legislation built over time, in response to growing 
frustration with FERC’s disregard for its secondary mandates, a frustration that would not have 
arisen in the absence of a growing demand for environmental protection. And as we recounted, 
this momentum was reflected in judicial decisions, legislation, and pressure from both 
environmental interest groups and environmental agencies. 
Yet, as we have already argued, ECPA was more than epiphenomenal. It made FERC 
more vulnerable to the influence of collateral agencies by, among other things, requiring an 
explanation from FERC for departing from other agencies’ recommendations. The post-ECPA 
jump in environmental conditions is too striking, and the post-ECPA role of intervenors too 
powerful, to conclude otherwise. So even if ECPA depends upon, and in part reflects, 
background trends, this does not detract from our finding that ECPA made a difference. In 
particular, it does not undermine either of our two key claims: that inter-agency lobbying can be 
a mechanism of legislative control and, relatedly, that Congress can encourage this lobbying by 
altering the interest group market. 
188
 In the models of Table 6, this is the concern the intervenor variable is correlated with the error term of the model, 
leading to inconsistent (e.g., biased) estimates of the influence of intervenors on environmental conditions. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS
A. Lateral Legislative Control
Conceptually, our analysis extends both legislative control and interest group theories by 
broadening the purview of each, and highlighting their overlapping influences.  First, we explain 
our contribution to the literature on legislative control, which explores Congress’ ability to 
control the discretion it delegates to administrative agencies. Traditionally, this literature focuses 
on ex ante statutory requirements that limit agency discretion, and ex post oversight that can 
correct the agency when it deviates from congressional preferences. 189 Into this mix we offer a 
new source of control: collateral agencies. Our case study suggests that Congress specifically 
amended the FPA to strengthen the role of public agencies in FERC’s decision making process, 
and that this was an effective strategy for altering FERC’s behavior. 
Certainly, it is not new to suggest that Congress may try to control agency discretion with 
a combination of structural and procedural legislative requirements. McCubbins, Noll and 
Weingast190 originated this thesis some time ago, and others have since refined it.191 Indeed, 
Spence has applied this approach specifically to FERC, evaluating the effectiveness of 
congressional efforts to control FERC’s licensing decisions via procedural requirements in 
environmental statutes.192 And beyond ex ante mechanisms such as these, scholars have already 
proposed that Congress might enlist third parties in ex post oversight of agency discretion. The 
most famous example is McCubbins and Schwartz’ theory that Congress can equip interest 
groups to pull “fire alarms” to alert Congress to agency misbehavior.193 Yet to our knowledge, 
scholars have not explored the prospect that Congress might rely specifically on inter-agency 
lobbying as a mechanism of control. 
189 See McCubbins and Schwartz, Police Patrols, supra note 32; Bendor et. al., 1985; McCubbins et. al., supra note 
31; Aberbach, 1990 supra note 31.
190 See Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of 
Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) (hereafter Administrative Procedures); Matthew D. McCubbins, 
Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and 
the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. Rev. 431 (1989).
191 See e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and the Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J. L. 
ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992); John A. Ferejohn, The Structure of Agency Decision Processes, in CONGRESS: 
STRUCTURE AND POLICY (Matthew McCubbins & Terry Sullivan, ed., 1987). McNollgast originally proposed that 
Congress can structure agency decision making to lock in deals made in legislative bargaining. See McNollgast, 
Administrative Procedures, supra note. Other scholars have contested this account, noting that procedures afford 
even members of the losing coalition opportunities to challenge implementation at the administrative stage. See e.g.,
Jerry L. Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive and Critical Stories of Legal 
Development, 6 J. L. & ORG. 267 (1990). See also Jerry L. Mashaw, GREED CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE (1997). 
192 See e.g., Spence, supra note. Spence’s study covers licensing decisions between 1960 and 1990. He argues that 
environmental statutes such as WSRA, the CWA and NEPA, along with PURPA and ECPA, exemplify efforts at 
procedural control. Based on his own empirical study, Spence concludes that FERC is somewhat resistant to 
political control. Our study, by contrast, makes the specific point that Congress may try to control agency decision 
making by strengthening other agencies to intervene in its process. Spence’s conclusions about ECPA’s 
effectiveness are not ideal for analyzing the effect of ECPA because the study ends in 1990, the year that we use as a 
baseline for the statute’s full implementation. 
193See McCubbins and Schwartz, Police Patrols, supra note 32.
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Why would Congress rely on lateral legislative control? In theory, this should not be 
necessary because secondary mandates ought to bind the agency. But as we have shown, a 
failure of all relevant principals to enforce these secondary mandates led the agency to ignore 
them. Congress has some alternatives to relying on collateral agencies, however. It could, for 
example, take the task upon itself. Congress could determine the environmental conditions that 
ought to be imposed on dams of a particular age, with particular characteristics, sited in 
particular locations, without relying on collateral agencies at all. Yet, deputizing collateral 
agencies allows Congress to avoid making such time-intensive and potentially controversial 
determinations.  And presumably this strategy has an added benefit: it gives members of 
oversight and appropriations committees considerable leeway to influence the inter-agency 
process during implementation, enabling members, down the road, to intervene on behalf of local 
constituents in particular instances.194
Collateral agencies are attractive instruments of control because they have unique 
expertise that both Congress and the lead agency may lack. Generalist members of Congress 
cannot be expected to fully appreciate the environmental impacts of hydropower projects, and to 
develop mitigation strategies. Taking this level of detail upon themselves would be very costly in 
terms of both staff and member time. Yet forcing the reluctant agency to develop that expertise 
internally could also be costly, and duplicative of expertise that lies elsewhere in the government. 
The best strategy for internalizing fish and wildlife considerations into the agency’s 
licensing process under these circumstances, then, is to rely on outside agencies, like USFWS, 
USFS, and USNMFS, whose statutory mandates already require them to be environmental 
experts, and whose success in some measure depends upon their ability to prevent other agencies 
from frustrating their regulatory and management efforts. For example, the USFWS could not 
hope to protect endangered species as required by the ESA, if FERC continued to license 
hydropower with little concern for the devastating impact on anadromous fish runs. Neither 
could the Army Corps of Engineers enforce the WSRA without ensuring that FERC did not 
license a dam on an especially scenic river. Similarly, state environmental agencies could not 
ensure their own compliance with water quality standards under the CWA, without the authority 
to decline certification for hydropower licenses that would result in additional pollutants entering 
state waters. These agencies are already motivated to act on behalf of the interests that Congress 
wishes to strengthen. They are the natural candidates to enlist in lateral oversight.
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, relying on the lead agency itself to change 
could be risky. In our example, FERC had an internal culture that was resistant to environmental 
concerns, and a relative lack of professional expertise in the area. Even if Congress and the 
courts demanded it, change might be slow and difficult. Relying on collateral agencies provides 
something of an insurance policy to Congress in such circumstances. While FERC had, as we 
noted, hired additional environmental staff beginning in the late 1970s, and while existing 
environmental staff were moving into powerful management positions in the agency, there was 
reason to doubt whether the changes would take root. 
194 See DeShazo and Freeman, Congressional Competition, supra note 36.
- 54 -  LAW REVIEW [Vol.    :      
- 54 -
Collateral agencies that have consistently pressed for environmental concerns might also 
help to reinforce these developments at FERC. Indeed, there might be profitable synergies to be 
had among the professional staff in the different agencies. For example, FERC biologists tend to 
see fish and wildlife protection through a hydropower prism; they have heightened expertise 
about how to mitigate the impact of dams. The biologists in wildlife agencies may lack 
specialized expertise about hydropower, but their general knowledge about species and habitat 
might exceed that of the FERC experts.195 Combining the different expertise distributed among 
the agencies could lead to more effective strategies for mitigation. Presumably, moreover, 
developing working relationships with professionals in other agencies, especially those with 
similar disciplinary training, could help to reinforce FERC’s culture shift. 
One might argue, however, that in deputizing collateral agencies, Congress is merely 
enfranchising the interest groups that tend to lobby those agencies (e.g., the environmental 
groups that lobby USFWS). This is certainly possible. Yet the extent to which one believes this 
depends on the extent to which one believes that agencies are so dominated by the interests that 
lobby them that they are effectively “captured”—and this remains a contentious issue in political 
science. Moreover, presumably Congress could enfranchise these private interest groups directly 
if it were so inclined. We think it more likely that Congress chooses collateral agencies because 
of their expertise, and their predictable preferences. Congress can rely on these agencies to press 
for their historical interests, which in our case was environmental protection. Moreover, their 
own oversight committees can ensure that they do. 
This adds another reason why Congress might choose to rely on collateral agencies: it 
helps to empower their oversight committees vis a vis the oversight committees with power to 
oversee FERC. Why is this relevant? The struggle over how much attention FERC should pay to 
environmental concerns can be viewed as an inter-committee struggle in Congress, as we 
mentioned earlier. Members serving on committees that oversee the environmental and resource 
management agencies are likely to have different preferences than those who serve on the 
committees with oversight over energy. When Congress gives a larger role in FERC 
decisionmaking to the environmental agencies, it is readjusting power within Congress itself. 
B. The Mode of Congressional Intervention  
Our study made us wonder whether the form of congressional intervention matters when 
it comes to the reluctant agency. In this case, Congress elected to strengthen collateral agencies, 
and to do so specifically by amending the FPA itself.  In doing so, Congress transformed an 
195
 “There are two levels of expertise when dealing with energy infrastructure: the local biologists and the FERC 
people. The local biologists know where the trout are. They know their damn trout! But the expertise of the wildlife 
biologist that works at FERC is different because everything they do goes through prism of hydropower project. So 
the FERC biologist knows the best mitigation for inundating these kinds of lands or what have you—they integrate 
the wildlife concern with the engineering issues. The local guys are focused on their species and the many things 
that affect the health of their species.  FERC staff are focused on the engineering and ecological aspects of 
hydropower. The ESA guy is worried about the bull trout, but it’s being affected by 500 different actions, like the 
new car wash, the new road, and irrigation. But FERC knows hydropower mitigation.”  Robertson Interview, supra
note .
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inter-statute conflict between FERC’s competing mandates (i.e., its mandate to license power 
pursuant to the FPA and its mandate to protect the environment pursuant to a host of 
environmental statutes) into an intra-statute one, by amending the agency’s enabling law. At 
least in some circumstances, such a strategy might be optimal.
Our data do not speak directly to this issue, but we flag it as an interesting question for 
future research. We expect that most political scientists would say that form should not matter; 
what matters is whether Congress intends to make FERC change.  Yet, as we pointed out, the 
legislative history of ECPA reveals how important it was for members to amend the FPA 
itself.196  Our thoughts on this are necessarily preliminary, and secondary to our main point about 
the potential power of lateral legislative control but we think it worth asking: is it possible that 
statutes of general application may, for one reason or another, be taken less seriously than 
specific amendments to the agency’s own enabling law?  Quite apart from oversight, is it easier 
as a cultural matter for agency officials to ignore obligations that they believe to not be their 
responsibility?197 It seems plausible that political appointees, agency lawyers and career staff 
might no longer be able to ignore mandates when they are unavoidably built into the statute they 
interpret and implement every day. Yet without extensive interviewing of agency officials, or an 
empirical test, we cannot answer this.
In our example, one might argue that Congress could have accomplished the same result 
by simply shifting its oversight priorities. Once the Senate Energy and Commerce Committee 
came to see the light about environmental considerations, it could have signaled FERC that the 
agency ought to be more sensitive to the suggestions of the resource agencies. Congress could, 
through aggressive oversight, have forced FERC to change its ways. Yet, amending the FPA, 
rather than relying on oversight alone, has its advantages. It locks in the new congressional 
preferences, and limits the flexibility that subsequent oversight committees and members-at-
large to influence the agency subsequently. Should a future oversight committee direct the 
196 See House Report on ECPA (House Report No. 99-507, March 25, 1986, U.S.C.C.A.N. 2496) states that the bill 
“clarifies and improves the Commission’s licensing process in assuring adequate environmental 
protections….Specific provisions of the Federal Power Act are amended to ensure that hydroelectric development, 
management and operation will only be carried out in a manner consistent with the protection, mitigation of damage 
to, and enhancement of fish and wildlife (as now generally required by the Act under sections 10, 18, and 30) by 
making them specifically an integral part of the Commission’s licensing, exemption, and permitting process. These 
non-development purposes will be given ‘equitable treatment’ with the development purposes of the Act (at 2497 
emphasis added).” This implies that the Commission already had these obligations but that Congress was now 
making them more central to the Commission’s mission.
197 Consider NEPA, which imposes on all federal agencies an obligation to file an environmental impact statement 
for major federal projects significantly affecting the environment; or the ESA, which requires all federal agencies to 
consult with DOI or DOC over whether projects they support will jeopardize the survival of endangered species. 
While these mandates apply to FERC as they do all other agencies, they arise in the context of statutes that are 
otherwise irrelevant to FERC and not viewed as part of its domain. NEPA is the responsibility of the Council on 
Environmental Quality (in the Executive Office of the President), which promulgates regulations governing the 
statute’s implementation and the ESA is the shared responsibility of the DOI (for terrestrial species) and the DOC 
(for marine species). Can amending an agency’s enabling law spur or accelerate a cultural shift in the agency? Does 
it help the agency to internalize a conflict that it had previously been able to externalize (e.g., the understanding that 
environmental mandates are the responsibility of environmental agencies, whereas the FPA’s energy related 
mandate is FERC’s responsibility)?
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agency to act in a manner that runs directly counter to the now clear statutory mandate, that 
member runs the risk that the agency will (at the behest of its own political appointees and legal 
counsel) resist, or that even if the agency complies, the decision will be reversed upon judicial 
review. This is especially likely if the legislation enables third parties to sue to enforce the new 
mandates. Courts are reluctant to read congressional preferences into oversight behavior, because 
it is unreliable and not formalized into law but they are accustomed to reading statutes, and feel 
quite comfortable policing agency compliance with statutory mandates. Amending the FPA, 
therefore, indirectly empowered courts to oversee FERC’s licensing process even more 
closely.198
B. Interest Group Theory
The implications of our analysis for the literature on interest group competition are 
equally important.  Interest group theory has focused primarily on explaining the reasons why 
some interest groups become more powerful than others in the legislative and administrative 
process. The classic analysis is that interest groups facing the prospect of concentrated benefits 
and diffuse costs will prevail over those that stand to gain only diffuse benefits; the latter groups 
have difficulties organizing because there are incentives to free-ride.199 Yet our results show 
something unexpected: public agencies can be the most frequent and effective intervenors in an 
administrative process. And our analysis suggests that, just as Congress can intervene in the 
interest group market to enable private groups to pull fire alarms, Congress can intervene to 
augment the influence of public agencies. 
Congress can do this with varying amounts of intensity.  ECPA did not introduce 
collateral agencies into FERC’s licensing process for the first time. Congress had already 
empowered these agencies to some extent through a variety of statutory mechanisms, including 
the longstanding “equal consideration” language in the FWCA; the general environmental 
impact statement requirement in NEPA; and the consultation requirements in WSRA, HCPA and 
ESA. The natural resource and management agencies did take advantage of these provisions as 
much as they could, intervening in FERC proceedings and joining lawsuits, as we described 
earlier. But for years, they were only marginally effective in convincing FERC to impose 
environmental conditions. Congress went much further in strengthening their hand when it 
passed ECPA. Beyond requiring “equal consideration” for non-power values in the FPA itself, 
the statute specifically named the resource agencies that were entitled to impose conditions, and 
it created a default presumption that their recommendations would be followed unless FERC 
could explain (presumably to a court’s satisfaction) why not.200 ECPA also mandates a dispute 
198 Indeed, our data show that legislative oversight during the period studied, even after ECPA, was associated with 
a drop in environmental conditions. See coefficient in Table_. So there was certainly not unanimity in Congress over 
the need to enforce environmental mandates more vigorously. The key oversight committee remained, on average, 
pro-power. As noted above, the driving force behind the environmental mandates in ECPA was Representative 
Dingell, the Chair of the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the Senate Committee on Energy and 
Commerce (and notably, the former Chair of the Fisheries and Wildlife subcommittee of the Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries Committee). The price for his support of ECPA’s other provisions was the adoption of the environmental 
amendments.
199 MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE GOVERNANCE (1965).
200 16 U.S.C § 803(j)(2).
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resolution process to replace the rather autocratic licensing process that FERC until that point 
had used.201
It stands to reason that Congress can also intervene to weaken collateral agencies that it 
might have empowered at an earlier time. In fact, the energy bill currently pending in Congress 
contains a provision that would re-weight the balance in FERC proceedings toward greater 
FERC discretion.202 Some in Congress apparently feel that the pendulum has swung too far in the 
direction of the fish and wildlife agencies.203
This is in part a response to the federal courts, which have helped to solidify, and even 
extend, the power of the resource agencies to condition FERC licenses. The most important case 
in this regard is PUD No. 1 v. Washington,204 in which the Supreme Court held that FERC 
licenses are subject to state certification for compliance with state water quality standards 
pursuant to §401 of the CWA. This section of the CWA requires states to provide water quality 
certification prior to a federal license being issued for any activity that may result in a discharge 
of pollutants into intrastate navigable waters.205 As a result of this conditioning power, a state 
may impose minimum flow requirements on license applicants. The PUD decision reinforces the 
Escondido case discussed earlier, in which the Court made clear that it would take the mandatory 
conditioning power of collateral agencies seriously.206 This shows that courts, and not just 
Congress, can strengthen inter-agency lobbying, though their ability to do so is much more 
limited; it depends on the existence of legislation (like the CWA in the PUD case; or section 18 
of the FPA in Escondido) that gives collateral agencies a role in the first place.
Finally, we note that our finding the public agencies can dominate the interest group 
market represents a potential challenge to public choice theory. If public agencies are effective at 
influencing one another, and if Congress can intervene to make the lobbying agencies even more 
effective, perhaps these agencies will give voice to a set of interests that might balance or 
neutralize the influence of private (usually well-financed and industry dominated), groups. 
Traditional public choice theory would predict that private groups representing concentrated 
costs and benefits would prevail in settings like those we described. Yet such predictions might 
need to be modified to account for the impact of public agencies.
201 Id.
202
 Cite as H.R.6, 10_th Cong. (2005).
203
 FERC’s process has changed substantially over time. See 1990 Handbook on Hydropower Licensing and 
compare to 2004 handbook. There is much more consultation occurring much earlier now, involving many federal 
and state agencies. See 2004 Handbook at 2-6 for a list of agencies that applicants must consult, including NMFS, 
USFWS, NPS, USEPA, federal agencies administering any US lands used or occupied by the hydropower project; 
the state agency with responsibility over fish and wildlife; state historic preservation officer; and Indian tribes. The 
process has become multi-lateral and has evolved considerably from the original bilateral “applicant-FERC” 
relationship in which intervenors were viewed primarily as irritants. Ultimately, all of this consultation may result in 
fewer formal interventions because agencies may come to feel less of a need to formally participate in licensing  
hearings. At some point, we may see a rise in environmental conditions but a drop in agency intervention , which 
might be evidence that FERC has internalized a consultative and negotiated approach to licensing.
204 511 U.S. 700 (1994)
205 See 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003).
206 See Escondido, supra note at. 
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D. Inter-Agency Lobbying as Policy Mediation
Our study sheds light on a dynamic that is widespread, but relatively invisible. Inter-
agency lobbying pervades the regulatory process, yet much of it is necessarily informal. The 
extent of this lobbying, its quality and effectiveness, may be hard to measure. Whether on agency 
succeeds in influencing another likely depends as much on cultural patterns and practices across 
agencies, and on personal relationships among counterparts, as it does on formal policies that 
attempt to structure such disputes. Indeed a great deal of inter-agency process is likely ad hoc, 
uncoordinated and fairly low-level. Only a small subset of inter-agency conflicts will wind up 
with one agency formally intervening in another’s licensing or rulemaking process. 
Inter-agency conflict seems, on first glance, to be dominated by the executive rather than 
the legislative branch. Most conflicts among executive agencies, one expects, will be managed 
by the president and his staff, who can resolve them informally—by signaling to political 
appointees that they should overcome their disagreements—or more formally, by simply taking 
the relevant decisions out of their hands. Of course, most conflicts will never reach this level, 
and will be resolved instead by staff within the agencies, by the lawyers in their respective 
Counsel’s offices, 207 or by political appointees exercising discretion. (Conflicts between 
executive and independent agencies may be especially challenging for the president, since his 
ability to control the independent agencies is significantly less.)
The most important player in coordinating agency action across multiple executive 
agencies may be the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in OMB, which 
annually receives the regulatory agendas of the federal executive agencies208 and which often 
exerts pressure on them to adapt their plans to the Presidents’ political priorities.209 For a subset 
of environmental and resource management issues that involve compliance with NEPA, the 
Council on Environmental Quality plays an important and statutorily prescribed role mediating 
inter-agency disputes.210 A number of Executive Orders address inter-agency conflicts as well.211
The point here is that we know relatively little about inter-agency decision making 
because much of it is invisible. And what we do know assumes that it is mostly a problem of 
coordination that must be handled by the executive branch. But our argument suggests that the 
inter-agency process is more than a problem that generates conflicts for the executive branch to 
207
 John Leshy, former Solicitor at DoI in the Clinton administration, commented to us that he spent a great deal of 
his time mediating inter-agency conflicts. Comments made at Environmental Law Conference, Harvard Law School, 
November 2003. 
208
 OIRA compiles the regulatory agendas from all federal entities that have regulations under development or 
review into the semi-annual Unified Agenda as part of its implementation of Executive Order 12866. See Regulatory 
Planning and Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (October 4, 1993). 
209 See comments of former OIRA official, The Future of Rulemaking,  American University Center for 
Rulemaking, March 16, 2005. 
210 The CEQ has, in the past, issued reports on the need for greater inter-agency cooperation, especially for 
managing large-scale multiple-agency efforts to manage natrual resources like watersheds but the report has been 
ignored. See CEQ Report.
211
 Cite relevant EOs.
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solve. It can, in our view, be a productive system of policy mediation, in which agencies 
introduce to other agencies a set of interests that they may otherwise ignore, or treat only lightly, 
even when those interests are intended by statute to be part of that agency’s decision making 
process. Thus, we think of inter-agency lobbying not, as some might, in perjorative terms, but as 
a mechanism for broadening the scope of the agency decisionmaking process.
Consider the extent to which FERC’s licensing process has been transformed. Some 
commentators reported to us that FERC no longer exercises final decision making power over 
licenses in any real sense; it has all but yielded its authority to the USFS, USFWS and state 
resource agencies, all of which now have mandatory conditioning power.212 The agency has 
significantly revised its approach to licensing, creating an “Integrated Licensing Process” in 
which license conditions are explicitly negotiated among agencies and stakeholders, and an 
“Alternative Licensing” option for speedier resolution of conflicts.213 As Robinson put it, FERC 
no longer acts the part of the imperial agency. Instead, it runs a “distributed authority” licensing 
program. Indeed, on some projects, seven different entities have mandatory conditioning 
power.214
Although there is a growing literature in political science on inter-branch lobbying (e.g., 
between the White House and Congress) we are not aware of significant academic commentary 
on agency-agency lobbying (whether between executive branch agencies or between them and 
independent agencies, as in our example). And while OMB’s oversight of Executive Orders 
requiring cost benefit analysis in rulemaking has been studied and critiqued extensively, the topic 
of inter-agency coordination more generally strikes us as under-explored. Here we have argued 
that Congress can be a stimulant to inter-agency lobbying when it serves Congress’ need for 
controlling agency discretion. This suggests that Congress may have a significant impact on 
inter-agency process, a possibility that may be underappreciated. Among other things, Congress’ 
use of lateral legislative control may have important separation of powers implications, as 
discussed below. 
E.  Separation of Powers 
Lateral legislative control may have implications for the separation of powers. When 
Congress relies on lateral legislative control, we have argued, it can strengthen the hand of some 
agencies vis a vis others. Congress may rely on this strategy as part of an effort to discipline a 
reluctant agency, as it did in our example. But in trying to exercise control in this way, Congress 
may also yield significant power to the president. On the one hand, this should not be surprising. 
All delegations of authority to executive agencies yield some control to the President, who 
oversees those agencies through political appointees. Where conflicts arise among agencies, or 
where they lobby each other, the president retains the power to step in and arbitrate disputes. 
212
 Interview with Mark Quern, November 2004, on file with author. 
213
 In the “integrated licensing process” the applicant’s pre-filing consultation process with resource agencies occurs 
concurrently with FERC’s NEPA scoping analysis. In the integrated process, Commission staff involvement begins 
in the pre-filing stage. See 2004 Handbook, supra.
214
 Robinson Interview, supra.
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Congress may not like the outcome in any particular case, but this is the risk Congress always 
takes when it delegates power. 
Yet lateral legislative control may raise unique problems where the empowered collateral 
agencies are executive and the agency made vulnerable to their influence is independent. In this 
case, Congress may yield even greater power to the executive branch than it normally would. 
The president may be able to step in to arbitrate conflicts, and effectively determine outcomes, in 
the independent agencies, which are traditionally not under presidential control. In our example, 
the president can influence how the fish and wildlife agencies behave in the FERC licensing 
process. This suggests that there could be separation of powers implications to lateral legislative 
control that do not attend the other instruments of control that Congress uses to oversee agency 
decision making. 
Of course, if Congress finds that it has ceded too much power to the executive branch to 
arbitrate disputes among executive and independent agencies, Congress can simply amend the 
statute and take the power back. Congress can, as we have pointed out, disempower collateral 
agencies just as easily as it empowers them. Perhaps not, however. Once the resource agencies 
become embedded in the FERC licensing process, and once cultural practices have changed (as 
Robinson suggested they have), it may be hard to shift the lead agency back. And though in our 
example, Congress gave every indication of acting intentionally (to make FERC’s more 
vulnerable to executive branch agencies and state agencies), we are concerned that Congress may 
not fully realize the larger, systematic consequences of lateral legislative control. Congress may 
not intend to give the President the authority to arbitrate inter-agency disputes.
F. Statutory Interpretation
Our argument may suggest a new rationale for deference to agency decisionmaking: 
courts should be more inclined to defer when the lead agency has negotiated with other affected 
agencies and there is consensus among them. Alternatively, in cases of inter-agency conflict over 
statutory meaning, courts should defer to the agency that Congress has chosen as the expert for 
purposes of that decisionmaking process, even if it is a collateral agency and not the lead agency 
implementing the relevant statute. While both of these suggestions are controversial, they are 
certainly worth considering. Yet they only emerge as possibilities once one appreciates the 
dynamic of inter-agency lobbying. 
Traditionally, when an agency like FERC is charged with multiple mandates (e.g., 
hydropower licensing and protection of fish and wildlife), and chooses to prioritize some over 
others, scholars and courts treat the agency’s decision as a routine problem of statutory 
interpretation. The agency’s resolution of any trade-offs would normally be reviewed under the 
Chevron215 test for agency interpretations of law, or the arbitrary or capricious test for agency 
decisions based on policy or fact,216 both of which are essentially reasonableness tests. If an 
agency ignores a clear statutory mandate, and the mandate is “procedural,” the court simply 
215 Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
216 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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ensures that the implementing agency observed the appropriate procedures, regardless of its 
ultimate decision. If the mandate is substantive, however, the court must wrestle with the balance 
the agency struck between competing substantive concerns.217 Regardless, from this perspective, 
the fact that the agency has multiple mandates is of no great consequence. It simply raises 
familiar questions about how courts should treat an agency’s exercise of its discretion. 
This traditional understanding of judicial review assumes that for most decisions most of 
the time, the only agency of concern is the lead agency charged with implementing a relevant 
statute. To the extent that agencies lobby each other, and to the extent that they negotiate 
outcomes, judicial review tends to ignore it.  We think, however, that the inter-agency dynamic 
ought to affect judicial attitudes toward the decisions under review. Shouldn’t it strengthen the 
case for deference that the ultimate agency decision is a product of consensus? Or is it possible 
that judges will look askance at such “deals” because they will think that agencies may have 
negotiated their way to a compromise that the statute does not authorize? 
And what should happen, as often did with FERC, when collateral agencies disagree with 
the lead agency’s decision? Shouldn’t this affect the reviewing court’s judgment about the 
reasonableness of the lead agency’s action? And when push comes to shove, which agency is 
entitled to Chevron deference? On the few occasions when courts have encountered this 
problem, they have given deference to the lead agency charged with implementing the statute, 
which in our case would be FERC. But should they do so, if Congress has specifically intervened 
to strengthen the role of collateral agencies over at least some aspects of decisionmaking?  While 
we cannot resolve these questions here, we flag them as interesting topics for future research. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have identified a new form of control upon which Congress might rely 
to convince “reluctant” agencies to change their ways: lateral legislative control or, alternatively, 
inter-agency lobbying. Congress did not invent inter-agency lobbying; in fact it occurs all the 
time. But Congress can intervene to strengthen the hand of some agencies to affect the 
decisionmaking of others, and in so doing can ensure that the lead agency takes account of 
considerations that it might otherwise ignore. 
In our example, we showed how FERC, an agency that had historically ignored a suite of 
environmental mandates, was brought to heel to a significant extent by collateral federal fish and 
wildlife agencies, and by state agencies willing to intervene in FERC’s licensing process. The 
ability of these agencies to influence FERC was helped along over time by the federal courts, 
which effectively granted them “conditioning” power over FERC licenses, and, as we showed 
with our empirical data, by ECPA, which Congress passed in 1986 in part to intensify this inter-
agency lobbying. The result, our data revealed, was more intervention by public agencies in 
FERC licensing, which resulted in many more environmental conditions imposed on the licenses 
217 For example, a reviewing court may have to resolve how OSHA should balance the need to ensure that workers 
suffer no “material impairment” from exposure to toxics in the workplace, with the tempering instruction that the 
agency do so “to the extent feasible.” See API v. OSHA (The Benzene case).
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FERC re-issued in the ensuing years, together with a much stronger, stable, and more structured 
role for collateral agencies in the licensing process. Hydropower licensing at FERC, it is fair to 
say, has now been transformed from a top-down process dominated by a single imperial agency, 
to a negotiated process in which other agencies have emerged as the most powerful players 
among all the stakeholders.
 Once one peels back the skin of administrative decision making, one finds not lone 
agencies making isolated decisions in a cocoon of bureaucratic insularity, but collections of 
agencies intervening in each other’s decisionmaking processes, sometimes formally and 
sometimes less so. This image of the administrative state is quite different—and much more 
dynamic—than the traditional view. It has implications not only for theories of legislative 
control, which we have emphasized here, but for our thinking about interest group theory, the 
separation of powers and statutory interpretation as well. This Article, merely scratches the 
surface of the complicated world of inter-agency process, which we hope becomes a focus of 
research in both political science and administrative law.  
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Appendix
Table 1A
Variable Definition
Dependent Variables
Total Requirements Number of environmental requirements issued per license
Interest Group Characteristics
Private Owner =1 if  the ownership of the project is a private utility, = 0 if private non-utility, municipal 
ownership, industrial, or cooperative ownership
Multiple Owner = 1if  the owner of the project also owns other projects under relicensing, or whether they 
are simply a single project owner, = 0 otherwise
Intervenor Groups Total number of intervenor groups in a project relicense
Federal Public Number of federal public intervenor groups in a project relicense
State Public Number of state public intervenor groups in a project relicense
Local Public Number of local public intervenor groups in a project relicense
Federal Non-Profit Number of federal non-profit intervenor groups in a project relicense
State Non-Profit Number of state non-profit intervenor groups in a project relicense
Local Non-Profit Number of local non-profit intervenor groups in a project relicense
Federal Private Number of federal private intervenor groups in a project relicense
State Private Number of state private intervenor groups in a project relicense
Local Private Number of local private intervenor groups in a project relicense
Legislative Principals
ECPAD = 1 if a project applied for a relicense after the Electric Consumer Power Act 
Amendments went into effect (January 2, 1990) , = 0 otherwise
LCV Score The average LCV score for the two senators representing the state that the project is 
located in, in the year the project applied for a relicense
Senate Committee =1 if either senator of the state in which the project is located was on the congressional 
committee which oversees FERC, the year the project applied for a relicense, = 0 
otherwise 
Local Conditions
Dam Height Dam height in feet above the streambed of the tallest  dam in the project
kW KW capacity generation of the project, divided by 103
Electricity Price Average annual price of industrial electricity in the state the project was
relicensed, for the year the project applied for a relicense (CPI deflated, base year
1970)
Concrete = 1if the dam(s) in the project were made of concrete, = 0 if earthfill, rockfill, 
timbercrib, or other
Dam Year Year (measured by the last two digits, so higher numbers imply younger  dams) 
the oldest reservoir involved in the project was put into operation 
Run-of-River =1 if the plant operation is run-of-river,  =0 if storage, gravity diversion, or reservoir only
NERC-West = 1 if the project is located in a Western NERC region , = 0 otherwise
NERC-East = 1 if the project is located in an Eastern NERC region, = 0 otherwise
NY Office = 1 if the project is licensed in the New York FERC office, = 0 otherwise
CH Office = 1 if the project is licensed in the Chicago FERC office, = 0 otherwise
SF Office = 1 if the project is licensed in the San Francisco FERC office, = 0 otherwise
PO Office = 1 if the project is licensed in the Portland FERC office, = 0 otherwise
River Miles Total river miles of all the dams (creating their respective reservoirs) 
Gross Storage/103 At-site maximum storage capacity in acre- feet divided by 103
Plant Factor % Percentage of time at which the plant is operating at optimal capacity
Recreation Use = 1 if the intended use of the project includes recreation, = 0 otherwise
     River Characteristics
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Endangered River =1 if the river of the project (within its state) is either an official Wild and Scenic River, 
or is listed on American Rivers’ Most Endangered Rivers list, = 0 otherwise
Endangered Species A count variable for the number of federally listed endangered species for all counties in 
the project area
Sociodemographic Variables* 
Population/103 The total population of the county in which the project is located, divided by 103
% Age 0-24 The percent of the total population of the county in which the project is located aged 0-24
% Age >75 The percent of the total population of the county in which the project is located over age 
75
% Bach. Degree The percent of the total population of the county in which the project is located holding a 
bachelors degree
Median Income/103 The median income of the county in which the project is located, divided by 103
% Below Poverty The percent of the total population of the county in which the project is located below the 
poverty line
Housing Units The total number of housing units in the county in which the project is located
Labor Force/103 The total civilian labor force of the county in which the project is located, divided by 103
Unemployed/103 The total number of unemployed in the civilian labor force 
of the county in which the project is located, divided by 103
Total Farms The total number of agricultural farms in the county in which the project is located
Manf. Earnings Manufacturing earnings in the county in which the project is located, measured in billions 
of dollars
Gov. Revenue Local government revenue of the county in which the project is located, measured in 
millions of dollars
*information taken from the 1988 and 1994 County and City Data Books – 1988 used for project license 
applications before 1990 and 1994 used for those after, http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/ccdb/
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Table A2
 Variable Summary Statistics
Dependent Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
   Variable Total 10.468 5.712 0 28
Interest Group Private Owner 0.64 0.481 0 1
Characteristics Multiple Owner 0.77 0.421 0 1
Intervenor Groups 12.041 18.649 0 227
Federal Public 3.338 2.513 0 14
State Public 2.982 2.451 0 14
Local Public 1.536 9.129 0 134
Federal Non-Profit 1.149 1.726 0 10
State Non-Profit 0.707 1.525 0 11
Local Non-Profit 0.829 2.55 0 29
Federal Private 0.401 1.279 0 10
State Private 0.527 1.371 0 11
Local Private 0.572 2.201 0 18
Legislative ECPAD 0.653 0.477 0 1
   Principals LCV Score 0.628 0.242 0 0.97  
Senate Committee 0.275 0.447 0 1
Local Dam Height 50.171 66.156 0 661  
Conditions kW  21.629 66.519 0 650.25  
Electricity Price 5.172  1.515 2.0223 9.23
Concrete 0.568   0.497 0 1
Dam Year 24.698 22.325 0 99
Run-of River 0.64 0.481 0 1  
NERC-West 0.189  0.393 0 1
NERC-East 0.523 0.501 0 1
NY Office 0.347 0.477 0 1
CH Office 0.356 0.48 0 1
SF Office 0.099 0.299 0 1
PO Office 0.077 0.267 0 1
River Miles 902.869 2001.965 0 19994
Gross Storage/103 92.162 418.596 0 4959
Plant Factor % 54.527 26.069 0 308
Recreation Use 0.55 0.499 0 1
  River Endangered River  0.18  0.385 0 1
    Characteristics Endangered Species 3.748 4.416 0 33
Sociodemographic Population/103 142.185 569.275 4.887 8295
Variables %Age 0-24 34.622 9.185 0 56.5
%Age>75 5.724 2.083 0 12.1
%Bach. Degree 14.065 5.086 6.5 34
Median Income/103 25.031 8.387 10.973 51.716
%Below Poverty 9.324 2.659 2.4 18
Housing Units 54812 196485.3 1400 2855578
Labor Force/103 69.113 280.502 1.661 4095
Unemployed/103 4.594 18.684 94 273
Total Farms 743.721 753.714 0 5911
Manf. Earnings/103 192.086 612.989 0.2 5035.309
Gov. Revenue 89616.85 233052.9 4.2 1610700
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Possible Endogeneity of Intervenors
Unobservable factors may affect both intervenor involvement and the requirements 
issued, leading to concerns about endogeneity.  To mitigate this we develop as comprehensive an 
empirical model as possible. Nonetheless we explore the presence of endogenieity by 
instrumenting for the presence of intervenors and then test directly for the endogeneity.  In Table 
A3, we present the first stage equation that predicts the presence of intervenors. Explanatory 
variables in this model include socio-demographic characteristics that should affect the behavior 
of local and state level intervenors as well as several characteristics of the dam and its 
surroundings.  In Table A4, Model 1 presents the base specification, while Model 2 is the same 
specification except that we instrument for the intervenor variable.  A  MacKinnon-Wu-
Hausman test finds that the endogeneity of intervenor participation is not significant at the 5% 
level, F(1, 204)=3.06  Prob>F=0.0816. 
Table A3
First Stage Poisson Model
Dep Var: Total Number of Intervenor Groups Per Project
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
Constant 2.343*** 0.308
Sociodemographic
Variables(A)
Population/106 -4.960 3.170
%Age 0-24 0.012*** 0.004
%Age >75 0.039** 0.019
% Bachelor’s  Degree -0.029*** 0.007
Median Income/106 -4.040 9.250
% Below Poverty -0.075*** 0.015
Housing Units/106 -8.660 5.640
Labor Force/106 6.860 5.510
Unemployed/103 0.140*** 0.019
Total Farms/103 -0.102** 0.045
Total Manufacturing 0.397*** 0.132
  Earnings/106
Total Local -0.547* 0.307
  Government Revenue/106
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Local Conditions (B)
Dam Height/102 0.220*** 0.048
kW/106 -6.220*** 0.849
Electricity Price -0.100*** 0.026
kW*Electricity Price/106 2.480*** 0.275
Concrete 0.300*** 0.054
Run-of-River -0.211*** 0.058
NY Office 0.717*** 0.099
CH Office -0.051 0.092
SF Office 0.032 0.144
PO Office 0.490*** 0.120
River Miles/103 0.041*** 0.013
Gross Storage/106 -0.275*** 0.066
Plant Factor % -0.004*** 0.001
Recreation Use Dummy 0.180*** 0.051
Endangered River 0.534*** 0.058
Endangered Species 0.016* 0.009
Multiple Owner 0.177*** 0.054
ECPAD 0.695*** 0.156
(A) Joint significance test:  Chi2(12)=131.73, Prob> Chi2=0.0000***
(B) Joint significance test:  Chi2(18)=800.93,  Prob> Chi2=0.0000***
Pseudo R2=0.3665
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Table A4:  OLS Models 1-3 
Dependent Variable – Total Requirements
Variable Model 1 Model 2-IV Model 3 
Constant 4.789** 4.973** 5.644***
(1.984) (1.996) (1.865)
Interest Group
Characteristics Private Owner 0.958 1.231* 0.474
(0.661) (0.677) (0.609)
Multiple Owner -0.971 -1.141 -0.734
(0.749) (0.763) (0.690)
Intervenor Groups 0.047*** 0.143**
(0.165) (0.056)
Federal Public 0.782***(E)
(0.141)
State Public 0.368***(E)
(0.139)
Local Public 0.095(E)
(0.060)
Federal Non-Profit -0.026(E)
(0.250)
State Non-Profit 0.642**(E)
(0.267)
Local Non-Profit -0.454*(E)
(0.251)
Federal Private 0.234(E)
(0.389)
State Private 0.137(E)
(0.340)
Local Private -0.548*(E)
(0.291)
Legislative
Principals ECPAD 5.453***(A) 4.613***(C) 3.444***(F)
(0.666) (0.796) (0.723)
LCV Score 5.75***(A) 5.038***(C) 3.426**(F)
(1.626) (1.645) (1.452)
Senate Committee -1.372*(A) -1.618**(C) -2.237***(F)
(0.824) (0.82) (0.740)
Local
Conditions Dam Height 0.014**(B) 0.0128*(D) 0.015***(G)
(0.07) (0.007) (0.006)
kW/103 -0.05***(B) -0.038**(D) -0.044***(G)
(0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
Electricity Price -0.683***(B) -0.586**(D) -0.630***(G)
(0.262) (0.262) (0.238)
kW*Elec. Price/106 17***(B) 11.497**(D) 13.8***(G)
(4.65) (5.432) (4.46)
Concrete 1.823***(B) 1.503**(D) 1.008* (G)
(0.61) (0.655) (0.559)
Dam Year -0.014(B) -0.012(D) -0.013(G)
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Run-of-River -1.226*(B) -1.176*(D) -1.11*(G)
(0.656) (0.665) (0.578)
NERC-West 2.134*(B) 1.981*(D) 1.510(G)
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(1.112) (1.120) (1.003)
NERC-East 0.089(B) -0.370(D) -0.933(G)
River (0.816) (0.834) (0.740)
Characteristics Endangered River 2.787*** 2.659*** 2.312***
(0.761) (0.782) (0.685)
Adj R2 0.491 0.487 0.618
(A) Joint significance test:  F(3, 205)=34.06,  Prob>F=0.0000***
(B) Joint significance test:  F(9, 205)=5.96,  Prob>F=0.0000***
(C) Joint significance test:  F(3, 205)=18.88 Prob>F=0.0000***
(D) Joint significance test:  F(9, 205)=3.56, Prob>F=0.0004***
(E) Joint significance test:  F(9, 197)=9.62, Prob>F=0.0000***
(F) Joint significance test:  F(3, 197)=17.63, Prob>F=0.0000***
(G) Joint significance test:  F(9, 197)=6.22, Prob>F=0.0000***
